Awesome
Professor Rowley's class is an interesting class. He is a very reasonable professor who's invested in your learning.
University of Rochester - Writing
Lecturer at University of Rochester
William D.
Rowley
Rochester, New York Area
William D. Rowley earned his PhD in philosophy at the University of Rochester in Spring 2016. His dissertation, "An Evidentialist Epistemology of Testimony," developed and defended an empirically informed account of testimonial justification and evidence.
Current research projects consider extensions of the dissertation in the epistemology of testimony, the nature of trust, and issues in the work of Locke, Hume, and Reid.
Areas of Specialization:
Epistemology
Early Modern Philosophy
Additional Research Interests:
Philosophy of Religion
Philosophical Theology
Social Epistemological Applications of Developmental Psychology
Social Epistemological Applications of Linguistics
Areas of Competence:
Philosophy of Religion
Metaphysics
Ethics
Applied Ethics
Additional areas of Teaching Interest/Expertise
Collegiate Writing
History of Philosophy (including Ancient and Medieval)
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Mind
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Philosophy
Dissertation: "An Evidentialist Epistemology of Testimony"
Advisor: Richard Feldman
Readers: Earl Conee and Edward Wierenga
Master of Arts (M.A.)
Philosophy
Teaching Assistant
Courses:
"Philosophy of Law," TA for John Bennett, course on basic issues in philosophy of law.
"Science and Reason," TA for Bradley Weslake, course on epistemological issues in philosophy of science.
"Ancient Philosophy," TA for Deborah Modrak, introductory course on Greek and Hellenistic philosophy.
"Ethics," TA for Jeffrey Glick, introductory course on normative ethics with some applied ethics.
Ph.D. Candidate - Department of Philosophy
Writing, Speaking, and Argument Program Teaching Fellow
Courses 2014-2015: "Ethics in Biomedical Research," introduces students to ethical issues in biomedical research (stem cell ethics, tainted data, animal research ethics, dual use research, equipoise, etc.) while satisfying the University of Rochester's primary writing requirement. Two sections per semester.
Courses 2015-2017: "Ethics at the Edges of Life," introduces students to bioethical issues concerning pregnancy and procreation (abortion, disability, liberal eugenics, etc.) as well as issues concerned with death and dying (physician-assisted suicide, double-effect, palliative sedation, etc.) while satisfying the University of Rochester's primary writing requirement. Two sections per semester.
College Writing Program Teaching Fellow
Courses 2011-2012: "The Ethics of Discovery," introduces students to ethical issues in scientific research (normative ethics, stem cell ethics, tainted data, animal research ethics, consent, etc.) while satisfying the University of Rochester's primary writing requirement. One section per semester.
Courses 2010-2011: "Knowledge and Skeptical Puzzles," introduces students to the theory of knowledge as well as Pyrrhonian and Cartesian skepticism while satisfying the University of Rochester's primary writing requirement. One section per semester.
Lecturer
Courses 2016-2018: "Taking it on Trust: Knowledge, Cooperation, and Vulnerability," a first-year writing course introducing students to ethical and epistemological issues concerning trust while satisfying the University of Rochester's primary writing requirement. Three sections per semester.
College Writing Program Dudley Doust Teaching Fellow
Courses 2012-2013: "Ethics in Biomedical Research," introduces students to ethical issues in biomedical research (stem cell ethics, tainted data, animal research ethics, equipoise, human enhancement, etc.) while satisfying the University of Rochester's primary writing requirement. One section per semester.
Master of Arts (M.A.)
Philosophy
Philosophy of Religion and Ethics
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
Philosophy
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
According to Roderick Chisholm, there are three ways of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul, Paul Moser, and Earl Conee have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problem that rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm describes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg the question or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity.
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
According to Roderick Chisholm, there are three ways of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul, Paul Moser, and Earl Conee have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problem that rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm describes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg the question or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity.
Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism
According to Roderick Chisholm, there are three ways of responding to the Problem of the Criterion and they all leave something to be desired. Michael DePaul, Paul Moser, and Earl Conee have each proposed variations of a fourth way of responding to this problem that rely on reflective equilibrium. We argue that these four options for responding to the Problem of the Criterion leave one with a tough choice: accept one of the three that Chisholm describes or DePaul’s reflective equilibrium approach and beg the question or accept a reflective equilibrium response of the sort Conee and Moser propose and embrace epistemic circularity.
Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism
Episteme 9.4
An objection to reductionism in the epistemology of testimony that is often repeated but rarely defended in detail is that there is not enough positive evidence to provide the non-testimonial, positive reasons reductionism requires. Thus, on pain of testimonial skepticism, reductionism must be rejected. Call this argument the ‘Not Enough Evidence Objection’ (or ‘NEEO’). I will defend reductionism about testimonial evidence against the NEEO by arguing that we typically have non-testimonial positive reasons in the form of evidence about our testifier’s evidence. With a higher-level evidence principle borrowed from recent work on the epistemology of disagreement, I argue that, granting some plausible assumptions about conversational norms, the NEEO is unsound.
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