Wheaton College - Political Science
Assistant Professor of Politics & International Relations
Higher Education
Timothy
Taylor
Wheaton, Illinois
Starting Fall 2016, I am an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Wheaton College. In April 2016, I received my PhD in Political Science from the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Davis.
My fields of study are International Relations, Comparative Politics, and Political Methodology.
My research and teaching interests include International Political Economy, Electoral Institutions and Trade, Comparative Political Economy, East Asia, Western Europe, and Experimental Methodology.
Assistant Professor of Politics & International Relations
Timothy worked at Wheaton College as a Assistant Professor of Politics & International Relations
PHD Candidate
Timothy worked at UC Davis as a PHD Candidate
Associate Instructor
Introduction to International Relations
International Relations in Western Europe
Graduate Teaching Assistant
Introduction to International Relations
Politics of Interdependence
Politics of Global Inequality
Scientific Study of War
US Foreign Policy
International Relations in Western Europe
Social Studies Teacher
Economics
World War II
Modern Middle East
World History
Global Studies
Social Studies Instructor
IB History (Higher and Standard levels)
IB Economics (Higher and Standard levels)
IB Business and Management (Higher and Standard levels)
Department Head
Master’s Degree
Political Science and Government
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Political Science and Government
Bachelor’s Degree
Social Studies Teacher Education
International Interactions
Why do some trade policies become electorally salient while others do not? While much of the literature argues that citizens act as a domestic constraint in the formation of trade policy, a general consensus has emerged that trade is most often a nonsalient issue among voters. This poses a paradox. On the one hand, trade models hinge upon voters’ rational self-interest and preferences for varying levels of protectionism to keep their governments accountable. On the other hand, the conditions by which trade becomes salient to these very voters in the first place are both undertheorized and untested. Using experimental evidence, I argue that two dimensions of a trade policy affect the likelihood of that issue becoming electorally salient. First, policies with large welfare effects should be more salient. Second, more complex issues should be less salient because such agreements are more likely to obfuscate an individual’s ability to discern its effects. I find support for my hypotheses that a trade policy’s salience tends to increase with the magnitude of its welfare effects and decrease with its complexity.
The following profiles may or may not be the same professor: