Sahar Aziz
- Courses12
- Reviews19
- School: Texas A&M University School of Law
- Campus:
- Department: Law
- Email address: Join to see
- Phone: Join to see
-
Location:
1515 Commerce St
Fort Worth, TX - 76102 - Dates at Texas A&M University School of Law: May 2012 - December 2016
- Office Hours: Join to see
Biography
Texas A&M University School of Law - Law
Professor and Chancellor's Social Justice Scholar at Rutgers Law School
Higher Education
Sahar
Aziz
Newark, New Jersey
Sahar F. Aziz is a Professor of Law and Chancellor's Social Justice Scholar at Rutgers Law School where she is the Director of the Center on Security, Race, and Civil Rights. Professor Aziz’s scholarship focuses on the intersection of national security and civil rights law with a focus on the post-9/11 era. She incorporates critical race theory, feminist theory, and constitutional law into her examination of the disparate impact of post-9/11 laws and public policy on ethnic, racial, and religious minority groups in the United States. Professor Aziz’s analyzes these issues in various contexts including immigration, counterterrorism, criminal justice, and civil rights litigation. Professor Aziz applies her scholarship in the American context towards her scholarship on rule of law and democracy promotion in post-revolution Egypt.
Professor Aziz served as a senior policy advisor for the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) where she worked on law and policy at the intersection of national security and civil rights. Prior to joining DHS, Professor Aziz was an associate at Cohen Milstein Sellers and Toll PLLP in Washington, D.C. where she litigated class action civil rights lawsuits alleging a nationwide pattern and practice of discrimination.
Professor Aziz has been featured on CNN, CSPAN, BBC World, Al Jazeera English, and published numerous commentaries on national security and civil rights issues issues in the New York Times, CNN.com, Houston Chronicle, Dallas Morning News, the New Arab, and the Huffington Post. Professor Aziz has presented her work in various forums including at U.S. Congressional Briefings, the Aspen Institute, the National Endowment for Democracy, the American Bar Association, the National Employment Lawyers Association and the Texas Bar Association. She is a co-editor of the Race and the Law Profs Blog.
Specialties: Civil Rights, National Security, Middle East Law, Race and the Law
Experience
Rutgers Law School
Professor of Law and Chancellor's Social Justice Scholar
Sahar Aziz is Professor of Law, Chancellor’s Social Justice Scholar, and Middle East and Legal Studies Scholar at Rutgers University Law School. Professor Aziz’s scholarship adopts an interdisciplinary approach to examine intersections of national security, race, and civil rights with a focus on the adverse impact of national security laws and policies on racial, ethnic, and religious minorities in the U.S. Her research also investigates the relationship between authoritarianism, terrorism, and rule of law in Egypt. She is the founding director of the interdisciplinary Rutgers Center for Security, Race, and Rights (csrr.rutgers.edu). She teaches courses on national security, critical race theory, evidence, torts, and Middle East law.
Texas A&M University
Professor of Law
Professor in National Security Law, Civil Rights Litigation, Post-9/11 Issues; Frequent speaker on national security and post-9/11 civil rights issues. Expert on Rule of Law in Egypt.
Brookings Doha Center
Nonresident Fellow - Foreign Policy
Sahar worked at Brookings Doha Center as a Nonresident Fellow - Foreign Policy
Bill of Rights Defense Committee
Counsel
Sahar worked at Bill of Rights Defense Committee as a Counsel
Law Office of Sahar Aziz
Attorney
Civil Rights, Employment Discrimination Law, Advocacy Before Federal Executive Agencies, National Security Law
Education
The University of Texas School of Law
J.D.
Law
The University of Texas at Austin
M.A. Middle East Studies
Law
The University of Texas at Arlington
B.S.
Management Information Systems
Publications
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws
George Washington International Law Review
This paper compares the laws before and after the revolution to determine whether the changes implemented are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. It critically assesses recent changes in Egypt’s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Second, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptic Christians to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions women and Egyptian Coptic Christians made to the revolution. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after its historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear - future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws
George Washington International Law Review
This paper compares the laws before and after the revolution to determine whether the changes implemented are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. It critically assesses recent changes in Egypt’s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Second, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptic Christians to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions women and Egyptian Coptic Christians made to the revolution. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after its historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear - future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS
Nebraska Law Review (forthcoming)
Failing states are havens for terrorism. A toxic combination of social, economic, and political crises attract violent extremist groups to establish bases in these lawless areas. As the groups grow in strength, the violence spreads from the immediate vicinity to the nation, region, and sometimes even other continents. Yet, global counterterrorism strategies focus more on symptoms rather than the underlying social, political, and economic conditions that produce politically-motivated violence. In particular, counterterrorism policies are driven by military and security interests of authoritarian states whose state violence breeds more violence by non-state actors. Western nations often limit their counterterrorism practices to merely preventing violence on their soil. With the advancement of technology, fluidity of borders, and ubiquity of international travel, countries can no longer afford to ignore the deteriorating conditions in failing states where terrorists set up bases. Nor can they limit their interest in failed states to bombing terrorist training camps or pushing terrorists underground. Only when the underlying political, social, and economic local hardships that produce fertile grounds for terrorists to operate are addressed can security improve for all people. Accordingly, this Article argues for a paradigm shift in the preventive goals of global counterterrorism policies that prioritizes human development based on the local needs of failing states. With the rise of violent transnational actors and fluid borders, the international community loses more than it gains by supporting dictators under the auspices of preserving stability. To the contrary, dictatorships breed terrorism as they inculcate a culture of violence and instill fear, suspicion, and aggression among the citizens. In turn, violence becomes the only means to effectuate change in a zero-sum game, winner takes all political system.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws
George Washington International Law Review
This paper compares the laws before and after the revolution to determine whether the changes implemented are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. It critically assesses recent changes in Egypt’s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Second, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptic Christians to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions women and Egyptian Coptic Christians made to the revolution. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after its historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear - future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS
Nebraska Law Review (forthcoming)
Failing states are havens for terrorism. A toxic combination of social, economic, and political crises attract violent extremist groups to establish bases in these lawless areas. As the groups grow in strength, the violence spreads from the immediate vicinity to the nation, region, and sometimes even other continents. Yet, global counterterrorism strategies focus more on symptoms rather than the underlying social, political, and economic conditions that produce politically-motivated violence. In particular, counterterrorism policies are driven by military and security interests of authoritarian states whose state violence breeds more violence by non-state actors. Western nations often limit their counterterrorism practices to merely preventing violence on their soil. With the advancement of technology, fluidity of borders, and ubiquity of international travel, countries can no longer afford to ignore the deteriorating conditions in failing states where terrorists set up bases. Nor can they limit their interest in failed states to bombing terrorist training camps or pushing terrorists underground. Only when the underlying political, social, and economic local hardships that produce fertile grounds for terrorists to operate are addressed can security improve for all people. Accordingly, this Article argues for a paradigm shift in the preventive goals of global counterterrorism policies that prioritizes human development based on the local needs of failing states. With the rise of violent transnational actors and fluid borders, the international community loses more than it gains by supporting dictators under the auspices of preserving stability. To the contrary, dictatorships breed terrorism as they inculcate a culture of violence and instill fear, suspicion, and aggression among the citizens. In turn, violence becomes the only means to effectuate change in a zero-sum game, winner takes all political system.
Coercive Assimiliationism: The Perils of Muslim Women's Identity Performance in the Workplace
Michigan Journal Race and Law (Fall 2014)
Fifty years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unlawful discrimination continues to ail American workplaces. Despite the prevailing narrative that America is now "post-racial" after the election of the first African American president, equal opportunity still eludes many Americans. Their membership in racial, ethnic, or religious groups stigmatized as the "other" adversely affects their access to education, political empowerment, and equal opportunity in the workplace. This Article applies social psychology and antidiscrimination theories to the case of Muslim women of color in the workplace, an under-researched area in legal scholarship. I examine in detail the identity performance challenges and contradictions faced by Muslim women of color as "intersectionals" facing stereotypes against 1) Muslims as terrorists, violent, and disloyal; 2) Muslim women as meek, oppressed, and lacking individual agency; 3) women as sexualized, terminally second best to men, and uncommitted to their careers; 4) immigrants as forever foreign and undeserving of equal treatment; and 5) ethnic minorities from the Middle East and South Asia as barbaric, misogynist, and anti-American. I conclude that Muslim women of color are at risk of falling between the cracks of Title VII jurisprudence due to courts’ unwillingness to recognize the harms caused by coercive assimilationst pressures to conform one’s identity to comport to high status group norms, irrespective of the relevance to work performance.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws
George Washington International Law Review
This paper compares the laws before and after the revolution to determine whether the changes implemented are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. It critically assesses recent changes in Egypt’s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Second, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptic Christians to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions women and Egyptian Coptic Christians made to the revolution. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after its historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear - future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS
Nebraska Law Review (forthcoming)
Failing states are havens for terrorism. A toxic combination of social, economic, and political crises attract violent extremist groups to establish bases in these lawless areas. As the groups grow in strength, the violence spreads from the immediate vicinity to the nation, region, and sometimes even other continents. Yet, global counterterrorism strategies focus more on symptoms rather than the underlying social, political, and economic conditions that produce politically-motivated violence. In particular, counterterrorism policies are driven by military and security interests of authoritarian states whose state violence breeds more violence by non-state actors. Western nations often limit their counterterrorism practices to merely preventing violence on their soil. With the advancement of technology, fluidity of borders, and ubiquity of international travel, countries can no longer afford to ignore the deteriorating conditions in failing states where terrorists set up bases. Nor can they limit their interest in failed states to bombing terrorist training camps or pushing terrorists underground. Only when the underlying political, social, and economic local hardships that produce fertile grounds for terrorists to operate are addressed can security improve for all people. Accordingly, this Article argues for a paradigm shift in the preventive goals of global counterterrorism policies that prioritizes human development based on the local needs of failing states. With the rise of violent transnational actors and fluid borders, the international community loses more than it gains by supporting dictators under the auspices of preserving stability. To the contrary, dictatorships breed terrorism as they inculcate a culture of violence and instill fear, suspicion, and aggression among the citizens. In turn, violence becomes the only means to effectuate change in a zero-sum game, winner takes all political system.
Coercive Assimiliationism: The Perils of Muslim Women's Identity Performance in the Workplace
Michigan Journal Race and Law (Fall 2014)
Fifty years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unlawful discrimination continues to ail American workplaces. Despite the prevailing narrative that America is now "post-racial" after the election of the first African American president, equal opportunity still eludes many Americans. Their membership in racial, ethnic, or religious groups stigmatized as the "other" adversely affects their access to education, political empowerment, and equal opportunity in the workplace. This Article applies social psychology and antidiscrimination theories to the case of Muslim women of color in the workplace, an under-researched area in legal scholarship. I examine in detail the identity performance challenges and contradictions faced by Muslim women of color as "intersectionals" facing stereotypes against 1) Muslims as terrorists, violent, and disloyal; 2) Muslim women as meek, oppressed, and lacking individual agency; 3) women as sexualized, terminally second best to men, and uncommitted to their careers; 4) immigrants as forever foreign and undeserving of equal treatment; and 5) ethnic minorities from the Middle East and South Asia as barbaric, misogynist, and anti-American. I conclude that Muslim women of color are at risk of falling between the cracks of Title VII jurisprudence due to courts’ unwillingness to recognize the harms caused by coercive assimilationst pressures to conform one’s identity to comport to high status group norms, irrespective of the relevance to work performance.
Egypt's Corruption Woes
CNN
Upon taking office, President Mohamed Morsy vowed to eliminate corruption in Egypt. Indeed, corruption was among the first issues he identified as posing the most serious challenge to the Egyptian economy. Yet despite his rhetoric, little has changed under his administration – so far, at least. By the end of last year, Egypt had dropped six spots in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of the perceived level of public sector corruption. Similarly, the Global Defense Sector Corruption Index ranked Egypt among the countries most susceptible to defense sector corruption.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws
George Washington International Law Review
This paper compares the laws before and after the revolution to determine whether the changes implemented are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. It critically assesses recent changes in Egypt’s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Second, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptic Christians to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions women and Egyptian Coptic Christians made to the revolution. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after its historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear - future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS
Nebraska Law Review (forthcoming)
Failing states are havens for terrorism. A toxic combination of social, economic, and political crises attract violent extremist groups to establish bases in these lawless areas. As the groups grow in strength, the violence spreads from the immediate vicinity to the nation, region, and sometimes even other continents. Yet, global counterterrorism strategies focus more on symptoms rather than the underlying social, political, and economic conditions that produce politically-motivated violence. In particular, counterterrorism policies are driven by military and security interests of authoritarian states whose state violence breeds more violence by non-state actors. Western nations often limit their counterterrorism practices to merely preventing violence on their soil. With the advancement of technology, fluidity of borders, and ubiquity of international travel, countries can no longer afford to ignore the deteriorating conditions in failing states where terrorists set up bases. Nor can they limit their interest in failed states to bombing terrorist training camps or pushing terrorists underground. Only when the underlying political, social, and economic local hardships that produce fertile grounds for terrorists to operate are addressed can security improve for all people. Accordingly, this Article argues for a paradigm shift in the preventive goals of global counterterrorism policies that prioritizes human development based on the local needs of failing states. With the rise of violent transnational actors and fluid borders, the international community loses more than it gains by supporting dictators under the auspices of preserving stability. To the contrary, dictatorships breed terrorism as they inculcate a culture of violence and instill fear, suspicion, and aggression among the citizens. In turn, violence becomes the only means to effectuate change in a zero-sum game, winner takes all political system.
Coercive Assimiliationism: The Perils of Muslim Women's Identity Performance in the Workplace
Michigan Journal Race and Law (Fall 2014)
Fifty years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unlawful discrimination continues to ail American workplaces. Despite the prevailing narrative that America is now "post-racial" after the election of the first African American president, equal opportunity still eludes many Americans. Their membership in racial, ethnic, or religious groups stigmatized as the "other" adversely affects their access to education, political empowerment, and equal opportunity in the workplace. This Article applies social psychology and antidiscrimination theories to the case of Muslim women of color in the workplace, an under-researched area in legal scholarship. I examine in detail the identity performance challenges and contradictions faced by Muslim women of color as "intersectionals" facing stereotypes against 1) Muslims as terrorists, violent, and disloyal; 2) Muslim women as meek, oppressed, and lacking individual agency; 3) women as sexualized, terminally second best to men, and uncommitted to their careers; 4) immigrants as forever foreign and undeserving of equal treatment; and 5) ethnic minorities from the Middle East and South Asia as barbaric, misogynist, and anti-American. I conclude that Muslim women of color are at risk of falling between the cracks of Title VII jurisprudence due to courts’ unwillingness to recognize the harms caused by coercive assimilationst pressures to conform one’s identity to comport to high status group norms, irrespective of the relevance to work performance.
Egypt's Corruption Woes
CNN
Upon taking office, President Mohamed Morsy vowed to eliminate corruption in Egypt. Indeed, corruption was among the first issues he identified as posing the most serious challenge to the Egyptian economy. Yet despite his rhetoric, little has changed under his administration – so far, at least. By the end of last year, Egypt had dropped six spots in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of the perceived level of public sector corruption. Similarly, the Global Defense Sector Corruption Index ranked Egypt among the countries most susceptible to defense sector corruption.
Policing Terrorists in the Community
Harvard National Security Law Journal
Twelve years after the September 11th attacks, countering domestic terrorism remains a top priority for federal law enforcement agencies. Using a variety of reactive and preventive tactics, law enforcement seeks to prevent terrorism before it occurs. Towards that end, community policing developed in the 1990s to combat violent crime in inner city communities is being adopted as a means of collaborating with Muslim communities and local police to combat 'Islamist homegrown terrorism.' Developed in response to paramilitary policing models, community policing is built upon the notion that effective policing requires mutual trust and relationships among local law enforcement and the communities they serve. While community policing in counterterrorism appears facially sound, this Article proffers that this endeavor is fraught with peril – both for collective civil liberties interests and local police’s interests in preserving relationships of trust. Accordingly, community policing exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying subordination of Muslims post-9/11 manifested in preventive counterterrorism policies, notwithstanding the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups. The Article asserts three critiques of community policing in counterterrorism: it is more akin to counterradicalization taken from military counterinsurgency strategy than the partnership-based traditional community policing model; to the collective detriment of communities it divides them into 'Good Muslims' willing to cooperate with law enforcement on the federal government’s terms and 'Bad Muslims' who demand a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of Muslim communities’ civil rights and liberties; and it deputizes Muslim leaders to gather and share seemingly innocuous information about their communities that may be used adversely to their collective interests as part of the predominantly prosecution-driven counterterrorism regime.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws
George Washington International Law Review
This paper compares the laws before and after the revolution to determine whether the changes implemented are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. It critically assesses recent changes in Egypt’s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Second, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptic Christians to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions women and Egyptian Coptic Christians made to the revolution. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after its historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear - future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS
Nebraska Law Review (forthcoming)
Failing states are havens for terrorism. A toxic combination of social, economic, and political crises attract violent extremist groups to establish bases in these lawless areas. As the groups grow in strength, the violence spreads from the immediate vicinity to the nation, region, and sometimes even other continents. Yet, global counterterrorism strategies focus more on symptoms rather than the underlying social, political, and economic conditions that produce politically-motivated violence. In particular, counterterrorism policies are driven by military and security interests of authoritarian states whose state violence breeds more violence by non-state actors. Western nations often limit their counterterrorism practices to merely preventing violence on their soil. With the advancement of technology, fluidity of borders, and ubiquity of international travel, countries can no longer afford to ignore the deteriorating conditions in failing states where terrorists set up bases. Nor can they limit their interest in failed states to bombing terrorist training camps or pushing terrorists underground. Only when the underlying political, social, and economic local hardships that produce fertile grounds for terrorists to operate are addressed can security improve for all people. Accordingly, this Article argues for a paradigm shift in the preventive goals of global counterterrorism policies that prioritizes human development based on the local needs of failing states. With the rise of violent transnational actors and fluid borders, the international community loses more than it gains by supporting dictators under the auspices of preserving stability. To the contrary, dictatorships breed terrorism as they inculcate a culture of violence and instill fear, suspicion, and aggression among the citizens. In turn, violence becomes the only means to effectuate change in a zero-sum game, winner takes all political system.
Coercive Assimiliationism: The Perils of Muslim Women's Identity Performance in the Workplace
Michigan Journal Race and Law (Fall 2014)
Fifty years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unlawful discrimination continues to ail American workplaces. Despite the prevailing narrative that America is now "post-racial" after the election of the first African American president, equal opportunity still eludes many Americans. Their membership in racial, ethnic, or religious groups stigmatized as the "other" adversely affects their access to education, political empowerment, and equal opportunity in the workplace. This Article applies social psychology and antidiscrimination theories to the case of Muslim women of color in the workplace, an under-researched area in legal scholarship. I examine in detail the identity performance challenges and contradictions faced by Muslim women of color as "intersectionals" facing stereotypes against 1) Muslims as terrorists, violent, and disloyal; 2) Muslim women as meek, oppressed, and lacking individual agency; 3) women as sexualized, terminally second best to men, and uncommitted to their careers; 4) immigrants as forever foreign and undeserving of equal treatment; and 5) ethnic minorities from the Middle East and South Asia as barbaric, misogynist, and anti-American. I conclude that Muslim women of color are at risk of falling between the cracks of Title VII jurisprudence due to courts’ unwillingness to recognize the harms caused by coercive assimilationst pressures to conform one’s identity to comport to high status group norms, irrespective of the relevance to work performance.
Egypt's Corruption Woes
CNN
Upon taking office, President Mohamed Morsy vowed to eliminate corruption in Egypt. Indeed, corruption was among the first issues he identified as posing the most serious challenge to the Egyptian economy. Yet despite his rhetoric, little has changed under his administration – so far, at least. By the end of last year, Egypt had dropped six spots in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of the perceived level of public sector corruption. Similarly, the Global Defense Sector Corruption Index ranked Egypt among the countries most susceptible to defense sector corruption.
Policing Terrorists in the Community
Harvard National Security Law Journal
Twelve years after the September 11th attacks, countering domestic terrorism remains a top priority for federal law enforcement agencies. Using a variety of reactive and preventive tactics, law enforcement seeks to prevent terrorism before it occurs. Towards that end, community policing developed in the 1990s to combat violent crime in inner city communities is being adopted as a means of collaborating with Muslim communities and local police to combat 'Islamist homegrown terrorism.' Developed in response to paramilitary policing models, community policing is built upon the notion that effective policing requires mutual trust and relationships among local law enforcement and the communities they serve. While community policing in counterterrorism appears facially sound, this Article proffers that this endeavor is fraught with peril – both for collective civil liberties interests and local police’s interests in preserving relationships of trust. Accordingly, community policing exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying subordination of Muslims post-9/11 manifested in preventive counterterrorism policies, notwithstanding the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups. The Article asserts three critiques of community policing in counterterrorism: it is more akin to counterradicalization taken from military counterinsurgency strategy than the partnership-based traditional community policing model; to the collective detriment of communities it divides them into 'Good Muslims' willing to cooperate with law enforcement on the federal government’s terms and 'Bad Muslims' who demand a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of Muslim communities’ civil rights and liberties; and it deputizes Muslim leaders to gather and share seemingly innocuous information about their communities that may be used adversely to their collective interests as part of the predominantly prosecution-driven counterterrorism regime.
Bringing Down an Uprising: Egypt's Stillborn Revolution
Connecticut Journal of International Law
Despite warnings that bleak socio-economic conditions were pushing Egyptians to the brink, few could have predicted the timing and extent of what has come to be known as the “January 25th revolution.” For the two years that followed this unprecedented revolutionary moment, many Egyptians believed their nation was headed toward a political rebirth in the direction of democratization – albeit in fits and starts. But what ultimately transpired was far from a revolution, but rather an uprising. Those who risked life and limb in multiple mass protests are now in jail or dead while the military-security apparatus sits firmly at the apex of power. Rather than join other countries moving forward toward a free society, dissent in Egypt is brutally crushed harking back to Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s pervasive police state. This article seeks to answer the question on the minds of millions across the globe who witnessed Egyptians inspire the world as they rose up against a brutal authoritarian state: What happened to Egypt’s revolution? In hindsight, it has become clear that the moment the Egyptian military took on the official reins of leadership through the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on February 11, 2011, a pall was cast on the people’s revolutionary aspirations. What was supposed to be a historic political opening to transition Egypt onto a more democratic political trajectory resulted in a regression to military domination where soldiers, rather than civilians, control the levers of political, economic, and security power.
Independence without Accountability: The Judicial Paradox of Egypt's Failed Transition to Democracy
Penn State Law Review
This Article cautiously proceeds to examine why the Egyptian judiciary, despite its liberal rulings in the 1990s that facilitated the lead up to the January 25th revolution, ultimately obstructed the populist demands for revolutionary change. In doing so, the Article makes an intervention in the literature on rule of law in societies undergoing political transitions, and more specifically the role of judiciaries. Scholars have long stated that Egypt’s judiciary as one of the few state institutions willing to challenge executive authority and among the most independent judiciaries in the Middle East. This article challenges this position by arguing that the Egyptian judiciary opposed revolutionary reform efforts for four reasons. First, Mubarak’s concerted efforts since 2001 to quash judicial independence through coercive mechanisms imposed top-down by the loyalist judicial leadership effectively coopted a critical mass of judges. Second, the revolutionary youth and civil society failed to appreciate the judiciary’s circumscribed definition of judicial independence that did not include judicial accountability to the citizenry. Third, the judges’ elite notions of democracy viewed populism as a threat to the stability of the state and more specifically to the judiciary’s institutional interests. Finally, internal divisions within the judiciary with respect to the role of religion in adjudication coupled with longstanding suspicions of the Muslim Brotherhood as an authoritarian organization pushed judges into the arms of the military-security apparatus that sought to preserve the status quo. In sum, the judges preferred the devil they knew over the devil they did not know.
From the Oppressed to the Terrorist: American Muslim Women Caught in the Crosshairs of Intersectionality
Hastings Race and Poverty Law Review
In the post-9/11 era, Muslim women donning a headscarf in America find themselves trapped at the intersection of bias against Islam, the racialized Muslim, and women. In contrast to their male counterparts, Muslim women face unique forms of discrimination not adequately addressed by Muslim civil rights advocacy organizations, women’s rights organizations, or civil liberties advocates. The Article argues that the Muslim woman is a casualty of the post-9/11 “war on terror” in ways different from Muslim men. Not only are her religious freedoms under attack in ways different from men because the headscarf is unique to women, but she is objectified in ideological and corporal domestic conflicts that profoundly affect her life. Perhaps worse than the gender rights debates of the 1990s when Muslim women were talked about rather than talked to, their experiences post-9/11 are completely neglected by Western feminists or used by Muslim male spokespersons to implement a civil rights agenda tailored to the Muslim male experience. Consequently, Muslim women are trapped in the crosshairs of national security conflicts that profoundly affect their lives but not yet adequately addressed by advocacy groups focused solely on defending Muslims, women’s rights, or civil liberties post-9/11. The Article also highlights how the recasting of Islam from a bona fide religion to a political ideology is a necessary precursor for accepting otherwise discriminatory acts as legitimate national security practices. As Islam becomes defined as an expression of politics instead of religion, demands for religious accommodation by Muslims are deemed stealth Islamic imperialism not protected by law. It concludes by calling for a prescriptive rethinking of strategies aimed at redressing anti-Muslim bias and civil liberties infringements that take into account the gender component of post-9/11 discrimination.
Protest is Egypt's Last Resort
New York Times
Nearly three years after the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt is at a critical crossroads: Will it move toward democratization or regress into authoritarianism? With a vote on a new constitution slated for the next couple of months, and promises of parliamentary and presidential elections by summer, Egypt’s military-backed interim government claims it has a road map to correct the country’s deviation from the goals of the 2011 revolution. But the passage last week of a law effectively quashing the right to public protest suggests the opposite. According to the new law promulgated by the interim president, Adly Mansour, the government must be notified of all gatherings of more than 10 people. Demonstrations overnight or at places of worship are banned. Moreover, the Interior Ministry, which controls the country’s police force, has full discretion to reject applications; given the fact that police brutality is a frequent complaint of protesters, this arrangement poses a serious conflict of interest. Few Egyptians trust the ministry to approve requests fairly and without politicized prejudices. And the tedious paperwork demanded by the law means that the ministry can drag out the approval process for months.
Revolution without Reform? A Critique of Egypt's Election Laws
George Washington International Law Review
This paper compares the laws before and after the revolution to determine whether the changes implemented are sufficient to produce the structural reforms Egyptians demand. It critically assesses recent changes in Egypt’s electoral regime and considers whether Egypt had a revolution without reform. The thesis is twofold. First, the limited reforms made to election laws post-revolution are insufficient to produce the sustainable and meaningful democracy sought by Egyptians. Existing post-revolution laws fail to create transparent and independent processes that facilitate a level playing field among candidates and voter confidence in election outcomes. Second, the post-revolution amendments worsen prospects for Egyptian women and Coptic Christians to be elected to office, thereby further marginalizing them in the public sphere. Such adverse consequences are troubling in light of the significant contributions women and Egyptian Coptic Christians made to the revolution. In the end, Egypt is at the initial stages of a protracted transition from entrenched authoritarianism to democracy uniquely tailored to Egyptian cultural and religious norms. One year after its historic revolution, Egyptians have made great strides toward that common goal. Whether post-revolution reforms will be structural and produce a complete upheaval of a corrupt political system, as called for by most Egyptians, or merely superficial changes under the false guise of reform will determine the success of this transition. While it is still too soon to predict the outcome, one thing is quite clear - future political leaders who seek to impose authoritarianism do so at their own peril.
Rethinking Counterterrorism in the Age of ISIS
Nebraska Law Review (forthcoming)
Failing states are havens for terrorism. A toxic combination of social, economic, and political crises attract violent extremist groups to establish bases in these lawless areas. As the groups grow in strength, the violence spreads from the immediate vicinity to the nation, region, and sometimes even other continents. Yet, global counterterrorism strategies focus more on symptoms rather than the underlying social, political, and economic conditions that produce politically-motivated violence. In particular, counterterrorism policies are driven by military and security interests of authoritarian states whose state violence breeds more violence by non-state actors. Western nations often limit their counterterrorism practices to merely preventing violence on their soil. With the advancement of technology, fluidity of borders, and ubiquity of international travel, countries can no longer afford to ignore the deteriorating conditions in failing states where terrorists set up bases. Nor can they limit their interest in failed states to bombing terrorist training camps or pushing terrorists underground. Only when the underlying political, social, and economic local hardships that produce fertile grounds for terrorists to operate are addressed can security improve for all people. Accordingly, this Article argues for a paradigm shift in the preventive goals of global counterterrorism policies that prioritizes human development based on the local needs of failing states. With the rise of violent transnational actors and fluid borders, the international community loses more than it gains by supporting dictators under the auspices of preserving stability. To the contrary, dictatorships breed terrorism as they inculcate a culture of violence and instill fear, suspicion, and aggression among the citizens. In turn, violence becomes the only means to effectuate change in a zero-sum game, winner takes all political system.
Coercive Assimiliationism: The Perils of Muslim Women's Identity Performance in the Workplace
Michigan Journal Race and Law (Fall 2014)
Fifty years after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, unlawful discrimination continues to ail American workplaces. Despite the prevailing narrative that America is now "post-racial" after the election of the first African American president, equal opportunity still eludes many Americans. Their membership in racial, ethnic, or religious groups stigmatized as the "other" adversely affects their access to education, political empowerment, and equal opportunity in the workplace. This Article applies social psychology and antidiscrimination theories to the case of Muslim women of color in the workplace, an under-researched area in legal scholarship. I examine in detail the identity performance challenges and contradictions faced by Muslim women of color as "intersectionals" facing stereotypes against 1) Muslims as terrorists, violent, and disloyal; 2) Muslim women as meek, oppressed, and lacking individual agency; 3) women as sexualized, terminally second best to men, and uncommitted to their careers; 4) immigrants as forever foreign and undeserving of equal treatment; and 5) ethnic minorities from the Middle East and South Asia as barbaric, misogynist, and anti-American. I conclude that Muslim women of color are at risk of falling between the cracks of Title VII jurisprudence due to courts’ unwillingness to recognize the harms caused by coercive assimilationst pressures to conform one’s identity to comport to high status group norms, irrespective of the relevance to work performance.
Egypt's Corruption Woes
CNN
Upon taking office, President Mohamed Morsy vowed to eliminate corruption in Egypt. Indeed, corruption was among the first issues he identified as posing the most serious challenge to the Egyptian economy. Yet despite his rhetoric, little has changed under his administration – so far, at least. By the end of last year, Egypt had dropped six spots in Transparency International’s annual Corruption Perceptions Index, a measure of the perceived level of public sector corruption. Similarly, the Global Defense Sector Corruption Index ranked Egypt among the countries most susceptible to defense sector corruption.
Policing Terrorists in the Community
Harvard National Security Law Journal
Twelve years after the September 11th attacks, countering domestic terrorism remains a top priority for federal law enforcement agencies. Using a variety of reactive and preventive tactics, law enforcement seeks to prevent terrorism before it occurs. Towards that end, community policing developed in the 1990s to combat violent crime in inner city communities is being adopted as a means of collaborating with Muslim communities and local police to combat 'Islamist homegrown terrorism.' Developed in response to paramilitary policing models, community policing is built upon the notion that effective policing requires mutual trust and relationships among local law enforcement and the communities they serve. While community policing in counterterrorism appears facially sound, this Article proffers that this endeavor is fraught with peril – both for collective civil liberties interests and local police’s interests in preserving relationships of trust. Accordingly, community policing exacerbates, rather than resolves, the underlying subordination of Muslims post-9/11 manifested in preventive counterterrorism policies, notwithstanding the increase of homegrown terrorism threats from non-Muslim groups. The Article asserts three critiques of community policing in counterterrorism: it is more akin to counterradicalization taken from military counterinsurgency strategy than the partnership-based traditional community policing model; to the collective detriment of communities it divides them into 'Good Muslims' willing to cooperate with law enforcement on the federal government’s terms and 'Bad Muslims' who demand a meaningful quid quo pro that ensures protection of Muslim communities’ civil rights and liberties; and it deputizes Muslim leaders to gather and share seemingly innocuous information about their communities that may be used adversely to their collective interests as part of the predominantly prosecution-driven counterterrorism regime.
Bringing Down an Uprising: Egypt's Stillborn Revolution
Connecticut Journal of International Law
Despite warnings that bleak socio-economic conditions were pushing Egyptians to the brink, few could have predicted the timing and extent of what has come to be known as the “January 25th revolution.” For the two years that followed this unprecedented revolutionary moment, many Egyptians believed their nation was headed toward a political rebirth in the direction of democratization – albeit in fits and starts. But what ultimately transpired was far from a revolution, but rather an uprising. Those who risked life and limb in multiple mass protests are now in jail or dead while the military-security apparatus sits firmly at the apex of power. Rather than join other countries moving forward toward a free society, dissent in Egypt is brutally crushed harking back to Gamal Abdel-Nasser’s pervasive police state. This article seeks to answer the question on the minds of millions across the globe who witnessed Egyptians inspire the world as they rose up against a brutal authoritarian state: What happened to Egypt’s revolution? In hindsight, it has become clear that the moment the Egyptian military took on the official reins of leadership through the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) on February 11, 2011, a pall was cast on the people’s revolutionary aspirations. What was supposed to be a historic political opening to transition Egypt onto a more democratic political trajectory resulted in a regression to military domination where soldiers, rather than civilians, control the levers of political, economic, and security power.
Rule of Law, Not Rule by Law for Egypt
Huffington Post
Egypt has a rich legal history that has produced one of the most complex and sophisticated legal systems in the Middle East. But this very system has been one of the strongest tools in the arsenal of Egypt's dictators. Mubarak and his predecessors were notorious for concentrating their power through rule by law.
