Georgetown University - Philosophy
Specializing in philosophical and real-world bioethics
Laura
Guidry-Grimes
Little Rock, Arkansas
I am also a clinical ethicist at Arkasas Children's Hospital.
For more about me, please visit my professional website, which is updated regularly: http://lauragg.com
Master of Arts (M.A.)
Philosophy
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Philosophy
Teaching Associate/Instructor
Designing my own courses (own syllabus, assignment structure, lectures, etc)
Teaching Assistant
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
Philosophy, Religion
Hastings Center Report
Scientists, clinicians, and bioethicists are worried about how so-called personhood measures would limit access to certain types of contraception, research involving stem cells, and access to fertility treatments. While these measures have been struck down in Colorado, South Dakota, California, and Mississippi, the bill signed into law in Oklahoma in February deserves critical scrutiny, particularly into the ways these legal measures influence eligibility for clinical research. Oklahoma's bill states that the laws of the state “shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state.”
Hastings Center Report
Scientists, clinicians, and bioethicists are worried about how so-called personhood measures would limit access to certain types of contraception, research involving stem cells, and access to fertility treatments. While these measures have been struck down in Colorado, South Dakota, California, and Mississippi, the bill signed into law in Oklahoma in February deserves critical scrutiny, particularly into the ways these legal measures influence eligibility for clinical research. Oklahoma's bill states that the laws of the state “shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state.”
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
How can social institutions complicate and worsen vulnerabilities of particular individuals or groups? We begin by explicating how certain diagnoses within mental health and medicine operate as interactive kinds of labels and how such labels can create institutional barriers that hinder one's capacity to achieve well-being. Interactive-kind modeling is a conceptual tool that elucidates the ways in which labeling can signal to others how the labeled person ought to be treated, how such labeling comes about and is perceived, and how it compounds vulnerabilities. We argue that this shift in standpoint helps us recognize and mitigate compounded vulnerabilities.
Hastings Center Report
Scientists, clinicians, and bioethicists are worried about how so-called personhood measures would limit access to certain types of contraception, research involving stem cells, and access to fertility treatments. While these measures have been struck down in Colorado, South Dakota, California, and Mississippi, the bill signed into law in Oklahoma in February deserves critical scrutiny, particularly into the ways these legal measures influence eligibility for clinical research. Oklahoma's bill states that the laws of the state “shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state.”
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
How can social institutions complicate and worsen vulnerabilities of particular individuals or groups? We begin by explicating how certain diagnoses within mental health and medicine operate as interactive kinds of labels and how such labels can create institutional barriers that hinder one's capacity to achieve well-being. Interactive-kind modeling is a conceptual tool that elucidates the ways in which labeling can signal to others how the labeled person ought to be treated, how such labeling comes about and is perceived, and how it compounds vulnerabilities. We argue that this shift in standpoint helps us recognize and mitigate compounded vulnerabilities.
International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics
We argue that we have obligations to future people that are similar in kind to obligations we have to current people. Modifying Michael Bratman’s account, we argue that as planning agents we must plan for the future to act practically in the present. Understanding ourselves as relationally autonomous implies that those plans will involve building affiliative bonds and caring for others. We conclude by grounding responsibility to future others by the way we plan through our social institutions. Our account fills out the story of responsibility to future generations by referring only to ourselves, our practical identities, and practical reason.