Hari P. Adhikari
- Courses2
- Reviews3
- School: Embry Riddle Aeronautical University
- Campus: Riddle Aeronautical University
- Department: Business
- Email address: Join to see
- Phone: Join to see
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Location:
600 S Clyde Morris Blvd
Daytona Beach, FL - 32114 - Dates at Embry: December 2016 - November 2019
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Biography
Embry Riddle Aeronautical University - Business
Assistant Professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Hari
Adhikari, Ph.D.
Daytona Beach, Florida
Currently an Assistant Professor of Finance and Risk Management at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, Primary expertise and interest: research , teaching and financial consulting.
Experience
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Assistant Professor of finance and risk management
Hari worked at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University as a Assistant Professor of finance and risk management
Education
University of South Florida
Master of Arts (M.A.)
Mathematics
University of South Florida
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Finance, General
Tribhuvan University, Nepal
Master of Science (M.Sc.)
Mathematics
Publications
Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX era (regulatory, technological, and the ever-changing business environment) have forced corporate boards to incentivize top executives for the increased burden. We contend that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable, efficient, and trustworthy (to fulfill the regulatory requirements demanded by SOX) than their younger counterparts. Consistent with our contention, we find that the total compensation of CEOs of U.S. firms has increased significantly for older CEOs as compared to their younger counterparts after the introduction of SOX. Our results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques and also consistent with the logic that in order to motivate older CEOs (who would have raised substantial personal wealth over time) to keep working rather than retiring or moving to a competitor, their compensation package must be highly competitive.
Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX era (regulatory, technological, and the ever-changing business environment) have forced corporate boards to incentivize top executives for the increased burden. We contend that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable, efficient, and trustworthy (to fulfill the regulatory requirements demanded by SOX) than their younger counterparts. Consistent with our contention, we find that the total compensation of CEOs of U.S. firms has increased significantly for older CEOs as compared to their younger counterparts after the introduction of SOX. Our results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques and also consistent with the logic that in order to motivate older CEOs (who would have raised substantial personal wealth over time) to keep working rather than retiring or moving to a competitor, their compensation package must be highly competitive.
Inter-Firm Linkages and M&A Returns
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
This study investigates the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers and acquisitions. The findings indicate that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums when compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets with a strong connection to a customer have a lower chance of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long run abnormal returns suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for these targets. The implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals, and competing rivals are presented.
Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX era (regulatory, technological, and the ever-changing business environment) have forced corporate boards to incentivize top executives for the increased burden. We contend that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable, efficient, and trustworthy (to fulfill the regulatory requirements demanded by SOX) than their younger counterparts. Consistent with our contention, we find that the total compensation of CEOs of U.S. firms has increased significantly for older CEOs as compared to their younger counterparts after the introduction of SOX. Our results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques and also consistent with the logic that in order to motivate older CEOs (who would have raised substantial personal wealth over time) to keep working rather than retiring or moving to a competitor, their compensation package must be highly competitive.
Inter-Firm Linkages and M&A Returns
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
This study investigates the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers and acquisitions. The findings indicate that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums when compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets with a strong connection to a customer have a lower chance of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long run abnormal returns suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for these targets. The implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals, and competing rivals are presented.
The power of control: the acquisition decisions of newly public dual-class firms
Rev Quant Finan Acc (2017)
Many private firms that go public opt for a dual-class share structure which gives insiders stronger voting power, at the expense of shareholder democracy. We examine how the dual-class structure influences the merger decisions of newly public firms, which have a notable appetite for acquisitions. Specifically, we compare acquisition activity, method of payment choice, and the long-run value implications of acquisitions by newly public single-class and dual-class US companies. Our results show that dual-class IPO firms make relatively more acquisitions in innovative industries and are less likely to pay with stock as compared to single-class IPO firms. The reluctance of dual-class firms to pay with stock is positively related to the wedge between the insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights. We also find that newly-public dual-class acquirers perform better in the long-run than newly-public single-class acquirers, mainly due to dual-class acquisitions in innovative industries. Our multivariate analysis shows that these findings hold after controlling for relevant risk factors associated with industry, deal, and firm specific characteristics. These results suggest that the dual class structure may enable newly-public firms to make better M&A decisions after going public.
Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX era (regulatory, technological, and the ever-changing business environment) have forced corporate boards to incentivize top executives for the increased burden. We contend that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable, efficient, and trustworthy (to fulfill the regulatory requirements demanded by SOX) than their younger counterparts. Consistent with our contention, we find that the total compensation of CEOs of U.S. firms has increased significantly for older CEOs as compared to their younger counterparts after the introduction of SOX. Our results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques and also consistent with the logic that in order to motivate older CEOs (who would have raised substantial personal wealth over time) to keep working rather than retiring or moving to a competitor, their compensation package must be highly competitive.
Inter-Firm Linkages and M&A Returns
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
This study investigates the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers and acquisitions. The findings indicate that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums when compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets with a strong connection to a customer have a lower chance of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long run abnormal returns suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for these targets. The implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals, and competing rivals are presented.
The power of control: the acquisition decisions of newly public dual-class firms
Rev Quant Finan Acc (2017)
Many private firms that go public opt for a dual-class share structure which gives insiders stronger voting power, at the expense of shareholder democracy. We examine how the dual-class structure influences the merger decisions of newly public firms, which have a notable appetite for acquisitions. Specifically, we compare acquisition activity, method of payment choice, and the long-run value implications of acquisitions by newly public single-class and dual-class US companies. Our results show that dual-class IPO firms make relatively more acquisitions in innovative industries and are less likely to pay with stock as compared to single-class IPO firms. The reluctance of dual-class firms to pay with stock is positively related to the wedge between the insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights. We also find that newly-public dual-class acquirers perform better in the long-run than newly-public single-class acquirers, mainly due to dual-class acquisitions in innovative industries. Our multivariate analysis shows that these findings hold after controlling for relevant risk factors associated with industry, deal, and firm specific characteristics. These results suggest that the dual class structure may enable newly-public firms to make better M&A decisions after going public.
All in the Family: The Effect of Family Ownership on Acquisition Performance
Journal of Economics and Business
We examine the acquisition performance of family and non-family firms in the S&P 500 universe. Using style-adjusted and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and controlling for firm and merger characteristics, we find that the post-merger performance of family firms is significantly better than that of non-family firms. In particular, the mean one-year style-adjusted buy-and hold abnormal return is around 17% higher for family acquirers than for non-family acquirers. Further, contrary to the argument that founding family members make value-destroying diversifying acquisitions to minimize the risk of their personal portfolio, we do not find that family firms lose value in diversifying acquisitions. This result is consistent with Stein’s model (1997) showing that diversification helps to reduce the cost of capital of the firm.
Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX era (regulatory, technological, and the ever-changing business environment) have forced corporate boards to incentivize top executives for the increased burden. We contend that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable, efficient, and trustworthy (to fulfill the regulatory requirements demanded by SOX) than their younger counterparts. Consistent with our contention, we find that the total compensation of CEOs of U.S. firms has increased significantly for older CEOs as compared to their younger counterparts after the introduction of SOX. Our results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques and also consistent with the logic that in order to motivate older CEOs (who would have raised substantial personal wealth over time) to keep working rather than retiring or moving to a competitor, their compensation package must be highly competitive.
Inter-Firm Linkages and M&A Returns
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
This study investigates the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers and acquisitions. The findings indicate that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums when compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets with a strong connection to a customer have a lower chance of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long run abnormal returns suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for these targets. The implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals, and competing rivals are presented.
The power of control: the acquisition decisions of newly public dual-class firms
Rev Quant Finan Acc (2017)
Many private firms that go public opt for a dual-class share structure which gives insiders stronger voting power, at the expense of shareholder democracy. We examine how the dual-class structure influences the merger decisions of newly public firms, which have a notable appetite for acquisitions. Specifically, we compare acquisition activity, method of payment choice, and the long-run value implications of acquisitions by newly public single-class and dual-class US companies. Our results show that dual-class IPO firms make relatively more acquisitions in innovative industries and are less likely to pay with stock as compared to single-class IPO firms. The reluctance of dual-class firms to pay with stock is positively related to the wedge between the insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights. We also find that newly-public dual-class acquirers perform better in the long-run than newly-public single-class acquirers, mainly due to dual-class acquisitions in innovative industries. Our multivariate analysis shows that these findings hold after controlling for relevant risk factors associated with industry, deal, and firm specific characteristics. These results suggest that the dual class structure may enable newly-public firms to make better M&A decisions after going public.
All in the Family: The Effect of Family Ownership on Acquisition Performance
Journal of Economics and Business
We examine the acquisition performance of family and non-family firms in the S&P 500 universe. Using style-adjusted and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and controlling for firm and merger characteristics, we find that the post-merger performance of family firms is significantly better than that of non-family firms. In particular, the mean one-year style-adjusted buy-and hold abnormal return is around 17% higher for family acquirers than for non-family acquirers. Further, contrary to the argument that founding family members make value-destroying diversifying acquisitions to minimize the risk of their personal portfolio, we do not find that family firms lose value in diversifying acquisitions. This result is consistent with Stein’s model (1997) showing that diversification helps to reduce the cost of capital of the firm.
That is what Friends do: Employee Friendliness and Innovation
Journal of Economics and Business (2016).
Recent literature suggests that labor related issues can impact corporate innovation. In this study we hypothesize and find that firms with congenial work environments innovate more and have greater innovative efficiency. Our results also suggest that cash profit sharing and employee involvement have a positive bearing whereas union relationships have a negative impact on innovation output of a firm. In addition, subsample analysis reveals that employee-friendly policies are more important in industries having higher employee power. Our results are consistent with the logic that happy and satisfied employees tend to be more productive than the unhappy and dissatisfied ones. Our work suggests a channel through which satisfied employees contribute towards increasing firm value − by increasing the innovation productivity and efficiency of the firm. So, firms must make continued efforts towards creating and maintaining a friendly work environment.
Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX era (regulatory, technological, and the ever-changing business environment) have forced corporate boards to incentivize top executives for the increased burden. We contend that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable, efficient, and trustworthy (to fulfill the regulatory requirements demanded by SOX) than their younger counterparts. Consistent with our contention, we find that the total compensation of CEOs of U.S. firms has increased significantly for older CEOs as compared to their younger counterparts after the introduction of SOX. Our results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques and also consistent with the logic that in order to motivate older CEOs (who would have raised substantial personal wealth over time) to keep working rather than retiring or moving to a competitor, their compensation package must be highly competitive.
Inter-Firm Linkages and M&A Returns
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
This study investigates the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers and acquisitions. The findings indicate that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums when compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets with a strong connection to a customer have a lower chance of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long run abnormal returns suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for these targets. The implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals, and competing rivals are presented.
The power of control: the acquisition decisions of newly public dual-class firms
Rev Quant Finan Acc (2017)
Many private firms that go public opt for a dual-class share structure which gives insiders stronger voting power, at the expense of shareholder democracy. We examine how the dual-class structure influences the merger decisions of newly public firms, which have a notable appetite for acquisitions. Specifically, we compare acquisition activity, method of payment choice, and the long-run value implications of acquisitions by newly public single-class and dual-class US companies. Our results show that dual-class IPO firms make relatively more acquisitions in innovative industries and are less likely to pay with stock as compared to single-class IPO firms. The reluctance of dual-class firms to pay with stock is positively related to the wedge between the insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights. We also find that newly-public dual-class acquirers perform better in the long-run than newly-public single-class acquirers, mainly due to dual-class acquisitions in innovative industries. Our multivariate analysis shows that these findings hold after controlling for relevant risk factors associated with industry, deal, and firm specific characteristics. These results suggest that the dual class structure may enable newly-public firms to make better M&A decisions after going public.
All in the Family: The Effect of Family Ownership on Acquisition Performance
Journal of Economics and Business
We examine the acquisition performance of family and non-family firms in the S&P 500 universe. Using style-adjusted and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and controlling for firm and merger characteristics, we find that the post-merger performance of family firms is significantly better than that of non-family firms. In particular, the mean one-year style-adjusted buy-and hold abnormal return is around 17% higher for family acquirers than for non-family acquirers. Further, contrary to the argument that founding family members make value-destroying diversifying acquisitions to minimize the risk of their personal portfolio, we do not find that family firms lose value in diversifying acquisitions. This result is consistent with Stein’s model (1997) showing that diversification helps to reduce the cost of capital of the firm.
That is what Friends do: Employee Friendliness and Innovation
Journal of Economics and Business (2016).
Recent literature suggests that labor related issues can impact corporate innovation. In this study we hypothesize and find that firms with congenial work environments innovate more and have greater innovative efficiency. Our results also suggest that cash profit sharing and employee involvement have a positive bearing whereas union relationships have a negative impact on innovation output of a firm. In addition, subsample analysis reveals that employee-friendly policies are more important in industries having higher employee power. Our results are consistent with the logic that happy and satisfied employees tend to be more productive than the unhappy and dissatisfied ones. Our work suggests a channel through which satisfied employees contribute towards increasing firm value − by increasing the innovation productivity and efficiency of the firm. So, firms must make continued efforts towards creating and maintaining a friendly work environment.
CEO Optimism and the Credibility of Open-Market Stock Repurchase Announcements
Journal of Behavioral Finance
Given their low-cost and low level of commitment, open-market stock repurchase announcements are often viewed by the market with a degree of skepticism, leading to a weak initial market reaction followed by positive stock price drifts. The authors argue that the repurchase announcements made by optimistic CEOs should be more credible than those made by nonoptimistic CEOs. Our results show that optimistic CEOs are more likely to actually buy back their shares after the announcements and the abnormal returns following repurchase announcements are larger for optimistic CEOs. This evidence suggests that CEO optimism is an important factor that the market seems to overlook while evaluating the credibility of open-market repurchase announcements. Our main contribution is to link one of the most important managerial traits, optimism, to the open-market repurchases.
Dynamics of CEO compensation: Old is gold
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
There is an ongoing debate regarding the hiring and compensation of younger versus older employees. In this paper, we examine this question for Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in the context of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. We argue that the increased complexities in the post-SOX era (regulatory, technological, and the ever-changing business environment) have forced corporate boards to incentivize top executives for the increased burden. We contend that older CEOs are perceived as more reliable, efficient, and trustworthy (to fulfill the regulatory requirements demanded by SOX) than their younger counterparts. Consistent with our contention, we find that the total compensation of CEOs of U.S. firms has increased significantly for older CEOs as compared to their younger counterparts after the introduction of SOX. Our results are robust to sophisticated econometric techniques and also consistent with the logic that in order to motivate older CEOs (who would have raised substantial personal wealth over time) to keep working rather than retiring or moving to a competitor, their compensation package must be highly competitive.
Inter-Firm Linkages and M&A Returns
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance
This study investigates the value of customer/supplier relationships in mergers and acquisitions. The findings indicate that targets (suppliers) with strong customer/supplier relationships obtain higher abnormal returns and higher merger premiums when compared to targets with weak customer/supplier relationships. However, targets with a strong connection to a customer have a lower chance of being acquired. Acquirers that purchase targets with strong customer/supplier relationships have negative long run abnormal returns suggesting that the acquirers may have overpaid for these targets. The implications of customer/supplier relationships on customers, rivals, and competing rivals are presented.
The power of control: the acquisition decisions of newly public dual-class firms
Rev Quant Finan Acc (2017)
Many private firms that go public opt for a dual-class share structure which gives insiders stronger voting power, at the expense of shareholder democracy. We examine how the dual-class structure influences the merger decisions of newly public firms, which have a notable appetite for acquisitions. Specifically, we compare acquisition activity, method of payment choice, and the long-run value implications of acquisitions by newly public single-class and dual-class US companies. Our results show that dual-class IPO firms make relatively more acquisitions in innovative industries and are less likely to pay with stock as compared to single-class IPO firms. The reluctance of dual-class firms to pay with stock is positively related to the wedge between the insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights. We also find that newly-public dual-class acquirers perform better in the long-run than newly-public single-class acquirers, mainly due to dual-class acquisitions in innovative industries. Our multivariate analysis shows that these findings hold after controlling for relevant risk factors associated with industry, deal, and firm specific characteristics. These results suggest that the dual class structure may enable newly-public firms to make better M&A decisions after going public.
All in the Family: The Effect of Family Ownership on Acquisition Performance
Journal of Economics and Business
We examine the acquisition performance of family and non-family firms in the S&P 500 universe. Using style-adjusted and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) and controlling for firm and merger characteristics, we find that the post-merger performance of family firms is significantly better than that of non-family firms. In particular, the mean one-year style-adjusted buy-and hold abnormal return is around 17% higher for family acquirers than for non-family acquirers. Further, contrary to the argument that founding family members make value-destroying diversifying acquisitions to minimize the risk of their personal portfolio, we do not find that family firms lose value in diversifying acquisitions. This result is consistent with Stein’s model (1997) showing that diversification helps to reduce the cost of capital of the firm.
That is what Friends do: Employee Friendliness and Innovation
Journal of Economics and Business (2016).
Recent literature suggests that labor related issues can impact corporate innovation. In this study we hypothesize and find that firms with congenial work environments innovate more and have greater innovative efficiency. Our results also suggest that cash profit sharing and employee involvement have a positive bearing whereas union relationships have a negative impact on innovation output of a firm. In addition, subsample analysis reveals that employee-friendly policies are more important in industries having higher employee power. Our results are consistent with the logic that happy and satisfied employees tend to be more productive than the unhappy and dissatisfied ones. Our work suggests a channel through which satisfied employees contribute towards increasing firm value − by increasing the innovation productivity and efficiency of the firm. So, firms must make continued efforts towards creating and maintaining a friendly work environment.
CEO Optimism and the Credibility of Open-Market Stock Repurchase Announcements
Journal of Behavioral Finance
Given their low-cost and low level of commitment, open-market stock repurchase announcements are often viewed by the market with a degree of skepticism, leading to a weak initial market reaction followed by positive stock price drifts. The authors argue that the repurchase announcements made by optimistic CEOs should be more credible than those made by nonoptimistic CEOs. Our results show that optimistic CEOs are more likely to actually buy back their shares after the announcements and the abnormal returns following repurchase announcements are larger for optimistic CEOs. This evidence suggests that CEO optimism is an important factor that the market seems to overlook while evaluating the credibility of open-market repurchase announcements. Our main contribution is to link one of the most important managerial traits, optimism, to the open-market repurchases.
Possible Matching Profiles
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- Hari Adhikari
University of South Florida - Mathematics
