University of New Orleans - Economics
MPA Candidate - International Finance and Data Analytics
Giovanni worked at Columbia | SIPA as a MPA Candidate - International Finance and Data Analytics
Economic Strategy Consultant
Giovanni worked at Capital Markets Development Agency as a Economic Strategy Consultant
Senior Economic Adviser
Monetary Policy and Financial Regulation Board
Finance and Budget at the UN Democracy Fund
Giovanni worked at United Nations as a Finance and Budget at the UN Democracy Fund
Research Assistant
Giovanni worked at Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment as a Research Assistant
Master's degree
Economics
Courses: Microeconomic Theory, Statistics and Econometrics, Advanced Macroeconomics I and II, Advanced Microeconometrics, Time Series Econometrics, Advanced Economic Growth and Development, Development Economics
Master of Public Administration - MPA
International Finance and Data Analytics
MPA Candidate - International Finance and Data Analytics
Doctor of Philosophy - PhD
Financial Economics
Dissertation: Empirical Essays on the Capital Structure of Nations
Field I: Monetary Economics and Financial Markets and Institutions
Field II: International Trade and International Finance
Revista Podium No. 30 (2016)
Abstract: Some empirical evidence suggests that financial institutions that are too-big-to-fail (TBTF) have a competitive advantage, in terms of a lower funding cost, over their smaller counterparts. These advantages not only affect free competition in the system but also create a moral hazard. As a result, the financial system becomes more fragile when one of its institutions faces solvency problems. This paper aims to establish whether large financial institutions, in the Ecuadorian financial system, benefit from the advantages associated with being too-big-to-fail (TBTF). Specifically, this paper's purpose is to examine whether big banks obtain deposits at a lower rate of interest than smaller banks. Our results suggest that, for the period between 2007 and 2014, Ecuadorian big banks have benefited from a lower funding cost than small banks. Resumen: Existe evidencia empírica que sugiere que las instituciones financieras consideradas demasiado grandes para fracasar, "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF), gozan de una ventaja competitiva, en términos de un menor costo de fondeo, frente a instituciones más pequeñas. Estas ventajas no solo afectan la libre competencia en el sistema, sino también incrementan el riesgo moral. Como resultado, el sistema financiero se vuelve más frágil ante eventuales problemas de solvencia de una de estas instituciones. El presente trabajo de investigación pretende establecer si es que el grupo de bancos privados grandes del sistema financiero ecuatoriano goza de los beneficios asociados con las TBTF. En concreto se busca determinar silos bancos grandes obtienen fondos del püblico a una menor tasa de interés que los bancos pequeños. Los resultados de este análisis sugieren que, para el perIodo comprendido entre los años 2007 y 2014, los bancos grandes del sistema ecuatoriano se han beneficiado de un menor costo de fondeo que los bancos pequeños.
Revista Podium No. 30 (2016)
Abstract: Some empirical evidence suggests that financial institutions that are too-big-to-fail (TBTF) have a competitive advantage, in terms of a lower funding cost, over their smaller counterparts. These advantages not only affect free competition in the system but also create a moral hazard. As a result, the financial system becomes more fragile when one of its institutions faces solvency problems. This paper aims to establish whether large financial institutions, in the Ecuadorian financial system, benefit from the advantages associated with being too-big-to-fail (TBTF). Specifically, this paper's purpose is to examine whether big banks obtain deposits at a lower rate of interest than smaller banks. Our results suggest that, for the period between 2007 and 2014, Ecuadorian big banks have benefited from a lower funding cost than small banks. Resumen: Existe evidencia empírica que sugiere que las instituciones financieras consideradas demasiado grandes para fracasar, "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF), gozan de una ventaja competitiva, en términos de un menor costo de fondeo, frente a instituciones más pequeñas. Estas ventajas no solo afectan la libre competencia en el sistema, sino también incrementan el riesgo moral. Como resultado, el sistema financiero se vuelve más frágil ante eventuales problemas de solvencia de una de estas instituciones. El presente trabajo de investigación pretende establecer si es que el grupo de bancos privados grandes del sistema financiero ecuatoriano goza de los beneficios asociados con las TBTF. En concreto se busca determinar silos bancos grandes obtienen fondos del püblico a una menor tasa de interés que los bancos pequeños. Los resultados de este análisis sugieren que, para el perIodo comprendido entre los años 2007 y 2014, los bancos grandes del sistema ecuatoriano se han beneficiado de un menor costo de fondeo que los bancos pequeños.
Revista Científica Ecociencia
Abstract: This article examines the effect that the introduction of the Financial Security Network has on the banking system. In particular, it is explored through financial balance data from 26 Ecuadorian banks as the implementation of the Financial Security Network affects the behavior of deposits. Depositors' confidence in the banking system is expected to increase after the introduction of the Financial Security Network. Our results show that after the implementation of the Financial Security Network (RSF), greater financial stability is observed. Resumen: Este artículo examina el efecto que la introducción de la Red de Seguridad Financiera tiene en el sistema bancario. En concreto, se explora a través de datos de balances financieros de 26 bancos ecuatorianos como la implementación de la Red de Seguridad Financiera afecta el comportamiento de los depósitos. Se espera que la confianza de los depositantes hacia el sistema bancario se incremente luego de la introducción de la Red de Seguridad Financiera. Nuestros resultados encuentran que luego de la implementación de la Red de Seguridad Financiera (RSF) se observa mayor estabilidad financiera.
Revista Podium No. 30 (2016)
Abstract: Some empirical evidence suggests that financial institutions that are too-big-to-fail (TBTF) have a competitive advantage, in terms of a lower funding cost, over their smaller counterparts. These advantages not only affect free competition in the system but also create a moral hazard. As a result, the financial system becomes more fragile when one of its institutions faces solvency problems. This paper aims to establish whether large financial institutions, in the Ecuadorian financial system, benefit from the advantages associated with being too-big-to-fail (TBTF). Specifically, this paper's purpose is to examine whether big banks obtain deposits at a lower rate of interest than smaller banks. Our results suggest that, for the period between 2007 and 2014, Ecuadorian big banks have benefited from a lower funding cost than small banks. Resumen: Existe evidencia empírica que sugiere que las instituciones financieras consideradas demasiado grandes para fracasar, "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF), gozan de una ventaja competitiva, en términos de un menor costo de fondeo, frente a instituciones más pequeñas. Estas ventajas no solo afectan la libre competencia en el sistema, sino también incrementan el riesgo moral. Como resultado, el sistema financiero se vuelve más frágil ante eventuales problemas de solvencia de una de estas instituciones. El presente trabajo de investigación pretende establecer si es que el grupo de bancos privados grandes del sistema financiero ecuatoriano goza de los beneficios asociados con las TBTF. En concreto se busca determinar silos bancos grandes obtienen fondos del püblico a una menor tasa de interés que los bancos pequeños. Los resultados de este análisis sugieren que, para el perIodo comprendido entre los años 2007 y 2014, los bancos grandes del sistema ecuatoriano se han beneficiado de un menor costo de fondeo que los bancos pequeños.
Revista Científica Ecociencia
Abstract: This article examines the effect that the introduction of the Financial Security Network has on the banking system. In particular, it is explored through financial balance data from 26 Ecuadorian banks as the implementation of the Financial Security Network affects the behavior of deposits. Depositors' confidence in the banking system is expected to increase after the introduction of the Financial Security Network. Our results show that after the implementation of the Financial Security Network (RSF), greater financial stability is observed. Resumen: Este artículo examina el efecto que la introducción de la Red de Seguridad Financiera tiene en el sistema bancario. En concreto, se explora a través de datos de balances financieros de 26 bancos ecuatorianos como la implementación de la Red de Seguridad Financiera afecta el comportamiento de los depósitos. Se espera que la confianza de los depositantes hacia el sistema bancario se incremente luego de la introducción de la Red de Seguridad Financiera. Nuestros resultados encuentran que luego de la implementación de la Red de Seguridad Financiera (RSF) se observa mayor estabilidad financiera.
Journal of Economic Cooperation & Development
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of deposit insurance implementation on risk-taking behavior in the Ecuadorian private banking system. We use aggregated financial annual data of private banks financial statements from January 2007 to January 2015. Time series analysis employing system-wide financial ratios support our hypothesis that the levels of risk increased after deposit insurance was implemented in Ecuador on May 2009. Also, we observe that the increase of risk-taking behavior was mainly driven by large banks, which hold more than 60% of the banking system assets in total. This can easily have devastating effects on the insurance system and the whole economy if the moral hazard problem is left unattended.
Revista Podium No. 30 (2016)
Abstract: Some empirical evidence suggests that financial institutions that are too-big-to-fail (TBTF) have a competitive advantage, in terms of a lower funding cost, over their smaller counterparts. These advantages not only affect free competition in the system but also create a moral hazard. As a result, the financial system becomes more fragile when one of its institutions faces solvency problems. This paper aims to establish whether large financial institutions, in the Ecuadorian financial system, benefit from the advantages associated with being too-big-to-fail (TBTF). Specifically, this paper's purpose is to examine whether big banks obtain deposits at a lower rate of interest than smaller banks. Our results suggest that, for the period between 2007 and 2014, Ecuadorian big banks have benefited from a lower funding cost than small banks. Resumen: Existe evidencia empírica que sugiere que las instituciones financieras consideradas demasiado grandes para fracasar, "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF), gozan de una ventaja competitiva, en términos de un menor costo de fondeo, frente a instituciones más pequeñas. Estas ventajas no solo afectan la libre competencia en el sistema, sino también incrementan el riesgo moral. Como resultado, el sistema financiero se vuelve más frágil ante eventuales problemas de solvencia de una de estas instituciones. El presente trabajo de investigación pretende establecer si es que el grupo de bancos privados grandes del sistema financiero ecuatoriano goza de los beneficios asociados con las TBTF. En concreto se busca determinar silos bancos grandes obtienen fondos del püblico a una menor tasa de interés que los bancos pequeños. Los resultados de este análisis sugieren que, para el perIodo comprendido entre los años 2007 y 2014, los bancos grandes del sistema ecuatoriano se han beneficiado de un menor costo de fondeo que los bancos pequeños.
Revista Científica Ecociencia
Abstract: This article examines the effect that the introduction of the Financial Security Network has on the banking system. In particular, it is explored through financial balance data from 26 Ecuadorian banks as the implementation of the Financial Security Network affects the behavior of deposits. Depositors' confidence in the banking system is expected to increase after the introduction of the Financial Security Network. Our results show that after the implementation of the Financial Security Network (RSF), greater financial stability is observed. Resumen: Este artículo examina el efecto que la introducción de la Red de Seguridad Financiera tiene en el sistema bancario. En concreto, se explora a través de datos de balances financieros de 26 bancos ecuatorianos como la implementación de la Red de Seguridad Financiera afecta el comportamiento de los depósitos. Se espera que la confianza de los depositantes hacia el sistema bancario se incremente luego de la introducción de la Red de Seguridad Financiera. Nuestros resultados encuentran que luego de la implementación de la Red de Seguridad Financiera (RSF) se observa mayor estabilidad financiera.
Journal of Economic Cooperation & Development
Abstract: This paper examines the effects of deposit insurance implementation on risk-taking behavior in the Ecuadorian private banking system. We use aggregated financial annual data of private banks financial statements from January 2007 to January 2015. Time series analysis employing system-wide financial ratios support our hypothesis that the levels of risk increased after deposit insurance was implemented in Ecuador on May 2009. Also, we observe that the increase of risk-taking behavior was mainly driven by large banks, which hold more than 60% of the banking system assets in total. This can easily have devastating effects on the insurance system and the whole economy if the moral hazard problem is left unattended.
Cuestiones Económicas Vol. 26 (1) - Central Bank of Ecuador
Abstract: This paper studies the relation between deposit insurance implementation and moral hazard among Ecuadorian credit unions. We use monthly financial data of 34 credit unions from December 2007 to July 2015. Non-parametric mean difference test and panel data analysis employing monthly risk indicators are used to test for this relationship. Overall, results find no evidence to support our hypothesis that risk levels increased after deposit insurance was implemented in Ecuador on May 2009. However, with some specific indicators, we do find evidence that risk levels increased.
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect
Co-Preseident
The SIPA Finance Society is a student-led organization at the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University, created to give students interested in finance a venue for interacting, learning, mentoring and socializing. The club's objectives are to educate our members about the financial services industry, to help them gain practical experience, and to make them part of a strong social and professional network.urn:li:fs_education:(ACoAAAi_R_sBLCCIOhm2iPwPkjSYGoPmu3uHrEk,545709467)
Vice-President Elect