Miami Dade College (all) - English
Assistant Professor of Political Science at Weber State University
Richard
Price
Greater Salt Lake City Area
I serve as the department's law and courts specialist and pre-law advisor. My research focuses on the mobilization of legal arguments. First, my primary research has examined how lawyers respond to state court signals about the meaning and importance of state constitutional rights provisions. Second, and arising from this first interest, I have begun to explore how constitutional ideas migrate across borders by examining legal arguments before the Supreme Court of Canada how lawyers adapt to a new constitutional document and where they draw constitutional concepts from in attempting to give meaning to these new provisions. Third, I am part of a comparative free speech project funded by the National Science Foundation, award information linked below. I am in the early stages of collecting data on every free speech or press decision from state supreme courts for the Twentieth Century. One goal of this project is to track the changing nature of rights claimants as well as free speech topics overtime.
My teaching naturally focuses on law and courts subjects. I tend to utilize a historical approach highlighting the development of law as a function of institutional interactions, societal norms, political environment, and strategic considerations. My regular and occasional courses include American National Government, Constitutional Law I & II, The U.S. Supreme Court, Law and Society, Sexual Orientation, Politics, and Law, and Introduction to Law and Courts.
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
Political Science
Bachelor's Degree
Political Science, History
Juris Doctor (J.D.)
Forthcoming, Albany Law Review
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars and judges became interested in state constitutional law, arguing that state constitutions had been too long ignored especially in cases involving rights arguments. Empirical studies discovered, however, that actual application of state constitutional law in rights cases was uneven and limited over time, across issue areas, and between courts. This article seeks to deepen our understanding of variations in state constitutional application by exploring how and when litigants in state courts offer state constitutional rights arguments. I argue that it is important to examine the signals sent by state courts and how lawyers respond to those signals. Under the leadership of Justice Hans Linde, the Oregon Supreme Court embraced a powerful expectation that all issues of state law should be settled prior to any federal issue. Litigants responded to this signal by offering state arguments more often and in greater depth than litigants in other states. Linde’s legacy normalized state constitutional law, making it part of the everyday fabric of constitutional litigation in Oregon.
Forthcoming, Albany Law Review
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars and judges became interested in state constitutional law, arguing that state constitutions had been too long ignored especially in cases involving rights arguments. Empirical studies discovered, however, that actual application of state constitutional law in rights cases was uneven and limited over time, across issue areas, and between courts. This article seeks to deepen our understanding of variations in state constitutional application by exploring how and when litigants in state courts offer state constitutional rights arguments. I argue that it is important to examine the signals sent by state courts and how lawyers respond to those signals. Under the leadership of Justice Hans Linde, the Oregon Supreme Court embraced a powerful expectation that all issues of state law should be settled prior to any federal issue. Litigants responded to this signal by offering state arguments more often and in greater depth than litigants in other states. Linde’s legacy normalized state constitutional law, making it part of the everyday fabric of constitutional litigation in Oregon.
Albany Law Review 78(4): 1393-1458
The progress of judicial federalism, the independent interpretation of state constitutions, has generally been a stunted progress. This article explores how lawyers have contributed to the development of state constitutional rights law in the search and seizure context. Through a comparative study of lawyers in New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington, I argue that the ideational support provided by lawyers in the form of constitutional arguments has varied widely across the states in response to the legal signals sent by their high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. In essence, the argument is that lawyers need law and in the area of judicial federalism have largely waited for their state courts to provide some measure of leadership.
Forthcoming, Albany Law Review
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars and judges became interested in state constitutional law, arguing that state constitutions had been too long ignored especially in cases involving rights arguments. Empirical studies discovered, however, that actual application of state constitutional law in rights cases was uneven and limited over time, across issue areas, and between courts. This article seeks to deepen our understanding of variations in state constitutional application by exploring how and when litigants in state courts offer state constitutional rights arguments. I argue that it is important to examine the signals sent by state courts and how lawyers respond to those signals. Under the leadership of Justice Hans Linde, the Oregon Supreme Court embraced a powerful expectation that all issues of state law should be settled prior to any federal issue. Litigants responded to this signal by offering state arguments more often and in greater depth than litigants in other states. Linde’s legacy normalized state constitutional law, making it part of the everyday fabric of constitutional litigation in Oregon.
Albany Law Review 78(4): 1393-1458
The progress of judicial federalism, the independent interpretation of state constitutions, has generally been a stunted progress. This article explores how lawyers have contributed to the development of state constitutional rights law in the search and seizure context. Through a comparative study of lawyers in New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington, I argue that the ideational support provided by lawyers in the form of constitutional arguments has varied widely across the states in response to the legal signals sent by their high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. In essence, the argument is that lawyers need law and in the area of judicial federalism have largely waited for their state courts to provide some measure of leadership.
Law and Social Inquiry 40(4): 880-907
Detractors have long criticized the use of courts to achieve social change because judicial victories tend to provoke counterproductive political backlashes. Backlash arguments typically assert or imply that if movement litigators had relied on democratic rather than judicial politics, their policy victories would have been better insulated from opposition. We argue that these accounts wrongly assume that the unilateral decision by a group of movement advocates to eschew litigation will lead to a reduced role for courts in resolving the relevant policy and political conflicts. To the contrary, such decisions will often result in a policy field with judges every bit as active, but with the legal challenges initiated and framed by the advocates' opponents. We document this claim and explore its implications for constitutional politics via a counterfactual thought experiment rooted in historical case studies of litigation involving abortion and the right to die.
Forthcoming, Albany Law Review
Beginning in the 1970s, scholars and judges became interested in state constitutional law, arguing that state constitutions had been too long ignored especially in cases involving rights arguments. Empirical studies discovered, however, that actual application of state constitutional law in rights cases was uneven and limited over time, across issue areas, and between courts. This article seeks to deepen our understanding of variations in state constitutional application by exploring how and when litigants in state courts offer state constitutional rights arguments. I argue that it is important to examine the signals sent by state courts and how lawyers respond to those signals. Under the leadership of Justice Hans Linde, the Oregon Supreme Court embraced a powerful expectation that all issues of state law should be settled prior to any federal issue. Litigants responded to this signal by offering state arguments more often and in greater depth than litigants in other states. Linde’s legacy normalized state constitutional law, making it part of the everyday fabric of constitutional litigation in Oregon.
Albany Law Review 78(4): 1393-1458
The progress of judicial federalism, the independent interpretation of state constitutions, has generally been a stunted progress. This article explores how lawyers have contributed to the development of state constitutional rights law in the search and seizure context. Through a comparative study of lawyers in New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Washington, I argue that the ideational support provided by lawyers in the form of constitutional arguments has varied widely across the states in response to the legal signals sent by their high courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. In essence, the argument is that lawyers need law and in the area of judicial federalism have largely waited for their state courts to provide some measure of leadership.
Law and Social Inquiry 40(4): 880-907
Detractors have long criticized the use of courts to achieve social change because judicial victories tend to provoke counterproductive political backlashes. Backlash arguments typically assert or imply that if movement litigators had relied on democratic rather than judicial politics, their policy victories would have been better insulated from opposition. We argue that these accounts wrongly assume that the unilateral decision by a group of movement advocates to eschew litigation will lead to a reduced role for courts in resolving the relevant policy and political conflicts. To the contrary, such decisions will often result in a policy field with judges every bit as active, but with the legal challenges initiated and framed by the advocates' opponents. We document this claim and explore its implications for constitutional politics via a counterfactual thought experiment rooted in historical case studies of litigation involving abortion and the right to die.
Journal of Law and Courts 1(2): 331-61
Exploring legal development requires more than simply examining the votes of judges because legal development embraces the actions of multiple actors. At a minimum courts require lawyers to develop and present cases to them for adjudication. While courts need lawyers, lawyers need law; in other words, courts rely upon lawyers to develop cases for their review but the law provided by those courts shapes the actions of lawyers. This article examines the development of state constitutional law by exploring the interactions between lawyers and the Washington Supreme Court after the court required specific briefing practices for state constitutional arguments and the degree to which Washington lawyers responded. Utilizing legal briefs in Washington and some comparative data, I argue that the court was moderately successful at encouraging more thorough constitutional claims. This highlights the importance of considering how lawyers respond to court signals not only in the presence or absence of certain legal arguments, but also in the content of those arguments.