Resume

• 2008

  BS

  MS

  Economics

  University of North Carolina at Charlotte

  Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

  The Ohio State University

• LaTeX

  Stata

  Behavioral Economics

  Statistics

  University Teaching

  Microsoft Office

  Experimental Economics

  Microeconomics

  Data Analysis

  Research

  Microsoft Excel

  Economics

  Matlab

  Game Theory

  z-Tree

  Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

  Brock Stoddard

  We study framing effects in repeated social dilemmas by comparing payoff-equivalent Give- and Take-framed public goods games under varying matching mechanisms (Partners or Strangers) and levels of feedback (Aggregate or Individual). In the Give-framed game

  players contribute to a public good

  while in the Take-framed game

  players take from an existing public good. The results show Take framing and Individual-level feedback lead to more extreme behavior (free-riding and full cooperation)

  especially for Partners. These results suggest Take framing and Individual-level feedback increase the variability of cooperation.

  Framing and feedback in social dilemmas with partners and strangers

  We use a laboratory experiment to examine the role of social preferences in simple one-shot social dilemma games by comparing play with and without a human counterpart. We find that cooperation rates are slightly lower without a human counterpart in all games we consider. However

  the difference is small and statistically insignificant

  suggesting that social preferences are not the primary driver of cooperation in one-shot social dilemma games.

  Social preferences and cooperation in simple social dilemma games

  In this experiment I study a novel three-player ultimatum game in which two proposers with unequal amounts of money simultaneously submit offers to one responder

  who may accept at most one offer. I compare the predictions of inequity aversion

  advantage seeking

  and self-interest. Unlike previously studied cases of symmetric proposer competition

  the predictions of these models do not coincide in the asymmetric case. The experimental results show that responders sometimes accept the smaller offer

  and the degree of asymmetry between proposers affects responder behavior. The results further suggest heterogeneity among responders

  with advantage-seeking preferences occurring most frequently.

  Inequity aversion and advantage seeking with asymmetric competition

  We experimentally investigate team behavior in repeated public goods games and use team chat logs to study motives for contribution. Subjects are matched into two-person teams

  and each team makes a joint decision in each period. We compare teams with individuals and find similar overall contributions. However

  initial contribution is higher and endgame effects are more pronounced for teams. We examine strategic discussions within teams and find strong evidence of concern for repeated game effects and limited backward induction. We also find evidence of confusion and explore its potential sources.

  Strategic thinking in public goods games with teams

  I examine two dimensions of framing in public goods games: Contributing vs. Taking and Gains vs. Losses. I find decreased cooperation under the Taking frame

  but not under the Loss frame. This framing effect is stronger for men than women.

  Decomposing the effects of negative framing in linear public goods games

  Paul J. Healy

  Kevin Pflum

  Matthew Jones

  In a sequential-move

  finitely-repeated prisoners’ dilemma game (FRPD)

  cooperation can be sustained if the first mover believes her opponent might be a behavioral type who plays a tit-for-tat strategy in every period. We test this theory by revealing second mover histories from an earlier FRPD experiment to their current opponent. Despite eliminating the possibility of reputation building

  aggregate cooperation actually increases when histories are revealed. Cooperative histories lead to increased trust

  but negative histories do not cause decreased trust. We develop a behavioral model to explain these findings.

  Revealed reputations in the finitely-repeated prisoners’ dilemma

  Alex Hanning

  Gwendolyn L. Gill

  Peter M. Schwarz

  Using data from Charlotte

  NC

  a New South city without a legacy of heavily contaminated properties

  we find unremediated brownfields – typically former industrial properties believed to have modest contamination -- to have no effect on residential sales values

  but proposed cleanup and actual remediation have positive

  substantial

  and significant effects especially within 0.5 miles of the brownfield. Our results are consistent whether we examine all property values within a given distance

  such as 0.5 miles

  or examine discrete distances

  such as 0.3 to 0.5 miles. A conservative estimate of the benefits is on the order of $4 million.

  Estimating the effects of brownfields and brownfield remediation on property values in a New South city

  I show how improper conditioning of beliefs can reduce contribution in public goods environments with interdependent values. I consider a simple model of a binary

  excludable public good. In equilibrium

  provision of the public good is good news about its value. Naive players who condition expectations only on their private information contribute too little

  despite the absence of free-riding incentives. In a laboratory experiment

  contributions indeed fall short of the equilibrium prediction. Using modified games with different belief-conditioning effects

  I verify that subjects fail to condition beliefs properly. However

  improper belief conditioning cannot fully explain the results.

  Cursed beliefs with common-value public goods

  In this experiment

  I examine the extent to which competitive social preferences can explain over-bidding in rent-seeking contests. The Human treatment is a standard two-player contest. In the Robot treatment

  a single player bids against a computerized player

  eliminating potential social preference motives. The results show no difference in bids between treatments at the aggregate level. Further analysis shows evidence of heterogeneous treatment effects between impulsive and reflective subjects. Moreover

  impulsive subjects are more likely than reflective subjects to deviate qualitatively from the shape of the theoretical best response function.

  Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

  Durham University

  Virginia Commonwealth University

  The Ohio State University

  Richmond

  Virginia

  United States

  Associate Professor

  Virginia Commonwealth University

  The Ohio State University

  Virginia Commonwealth University

  Richmond

  Virginia

  Assistant Professor

  Lecturer in Economics and Finance

  Durham

  United Kingdom

  Durham University