Austin L. Reitenga
- Courses1
- Reviews9
- School: University of Alabama
- Campus:
- Department: Accounting
- Email address: Join to see
- Phone: Join to see
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Location:
The University of Alabama
Tuscaloosa, AL - 35487 - Dates at University of Alabama: April 2014 - February 2020
- Office Hours: Join to see
N/A
Would take again: Yes
For Credit: Yes
0
0
Mandatory
Good
This man is awesome. In order to enjoy his class, you need to appreciate his humor. The material is not that easy maybe because he doesn't elaborate his lesson much in the class. So make sure to have a review on the slides before taking the exams. 2 out of 3 projects are very easy. What surprises us is he will bring his dog in class. Such a man.
N/A
Would take again: Yes
For Credit: Yes
0
0
Mandatory
Awesome
Professor Reitenga is a rad dude. He is extremely knowledgeable and cool. I respect him immensely.
Biography
University of Alabama - Accounting
Associate Professor at University of Alabama
Higher Education
Austin
Reitenga
Tuscaloosa, Alabama
Attended Portage Northern High School in Portage, Michigan and Highlands High School in San Antonio, Texas. Received undergraduate degree in accounting from Texas State University. Worked as an accounting manager at H-E-B Grocery Company in San Antonio, Texas, CMA. Married with a son and a daughter.
Experience
University of Houston
Assistant Professor
Taught undergraduate accounting information systems.
University of Alabama
Associate Professor
Taught undergraduate accounting information systems, graduate information technology auditing and a doctoral seminar on archival research.
The University of Texas at San Antonio
Associate Professor
Taught undergraduate accounting information systems and a doctoral seminar on archival research.
Education
The University of Texas at Austin
Master of Business Administration (M.B.A.)
Business/Commerce, General
University of Kentucky
Ph.D.
Accounting
Publications
“Earnings Restatements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers”
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
We investigate involuntary chief financial officer (CFO) turnover following earnings restatements, the labor market penalties imposed on former restatement-firm CFOs, and whether these disciplinary consequences have increased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our results suggest that, relative to a control group of non-restating firms, firms restating earnings have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover, and that former restatement-firm CFOs face stiff labor market penalties. We generally find that the passage of SOX has not increased involuntary CFO turnover rates following restatements. However, we find that labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms are more severe in the post-SOX period, suggesting that SOX has increased ex post settling up costs. Our results suggest that the influence of SOX on the labor market has resulted in CFOs being held more accountable for their actions.
“Earnings Restatements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers”
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
We investigate involuntary chief financial officer (CFO) turnover following earnings restatements, the labor market penalties imposed on former restatement-firm CFOs, and whether these disciplinary consequences have increased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our results suggest that, relative to a control group of non-restating firms, firms restating earnings have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover, and that former restatement-firm CFOs face stiff labor market penalties. We generally find that the passage of SOX has not increased involuntary CFO turnover rates following restatements. However, we find that labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms are more severe in the post-SOX period, suggesting that SOX has increased ex post settling up costs. Our results suggest that the influence of SOX on the labor market has resulted in CFOs being held more accountable for their actions.
“Incentives and Opportunities to Manage Earnings around Option Grants”
Contemporary Accounting Research
This study examines discretionary accruals imbedded in quarterly earnings announcements that precede executive stock option grants. Prior empirical research indicates that managers attempt to increase the value of their option pay (by depressing the option’s exercise price) through a variety of strategies including timing voluntary disclosures, influencing option grant dates, or managing accruals. This study extends the research by jointly examining managerial incentives and opportunities to pursue an accruals-based strategy. We find evidence that discretionary accruals are lower when option pay is high and when concurrent firm performance is poor (incentive factors), but only when firms issue grants following earnings announcements relatively infrequently (opportunity factor). For firms that follow a predictable grant schedule, managers behave as if they believe that investors will discount earnings-based signals preceding the grant. Our results suggest that the decision to pursue an option-related strategy is influenced by economic tradeoffs. From a policy perspective, our results have relevance for the ongoing debate over option compensation practices, appropriate disclosure to investors, and the quality of corporate earnings.
“Earnings Restatements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers”
Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance
We investigate involuntary chief financial officer (CFO) turnover following earnings restatements, the labor market penalties imposed on former restatement-firm CFOs, and whether these disciplinary consequences have increased following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Our results suggest that, relative to a control group of non-restating firms, firms restating earnings have higher rates of involuntary CFO turnover, and that former restatement-firm CFOs face stiff labor market penalties. We generally find that the passage of SOX has not increased involuntary CFO turnover rates following restatements. However, we find that labor market penalties for former CFOs of restatement firms are more severe in the post-SOX period, suggesting that SOX has increased ex post settling up costs. Our results suggest that the influence of SOX on the labor market has resulted in CFOs being held more accountable for their actions.
“Incentives and Opportunities to Manage Earnings around Option Grants”
Contemporary Accounting Research
This study examines discretionary accruals imbedded in quarterly earnings announcements that precede executive stock option grants. Prior empirical research indicates that managers attempt to increase the value of their option pay (by depressing the option’s exercise price) through a variety of strategies including timing voluntary disclosures, influencing option grant dates, or managing accruals. This study extends the research by jointly examining managerial incentives and opportunities to pursue an accruals-based strategy. We find evidence that discretionary accruals are lower when option pay is high and when concurrent firm performance is poor (incentive factors), but only when firms issue grants following earnings announcements relatively infrequently (opportunity factor). For firms that follow a predictable grant schedule, managers behave as if they believe that investors will discount earnings-based signals preceding the grant. Our results suggest that the decision to pursue an option-related strategy is influenced by economic tradeoffs. From a policy perspective, our results have relevance for the ongoing debate over option compensation practices, appropriate disclosure to investors, and the quality of corporate earnings.
"CEO Bonus Pay, Tax Policy, and Earnings Management"
Journal of the American Taxation Association
In 1993, Congress passed Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), which eliminated the tax deductibility of nonperformance-based executive compensation over one million dollars. Recent research indicates that, as intended, code section 162(m) has strengthened the link between executive pay and firm performance. Although 162(m) apparently has changed executive compensation in a way desired by Congress, we hypothesize that 162(m) has indirectly influenced the financial reporting process. Specifically, we hypothesize and find evidence to support the following. For numerous reasons associated with “qualifying” a compensation plan per code section 162(m), executives in firms that qualify their compensation plans receive relatively low pay when their firm’s financial performance is extreme. Because these executives receive relatively low pay for extreme financial performance, an incentive exists to smooth reported earnings over time in order to maximize long-term compensation. The relatively smooth earnings patterns that we observe in qualified firms are related to the use of discretionary accruals.
