Resume

• 2003

  English

  French

  Master of Science (M.S.)

  Economics

  UCLA

  Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

  Economics

  UCLA

• 1996

  Bachelor of Science (B.S.)

  Finance / Economics

  New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business

• Political Economy

  Stata

  Data Analysis

  Policy Analysis

  Economics

  International Trade

  International Economics

  Development Economics

  International Development

  Econometrics

  Statistics

  Rising Food Prices and Declining Food Security: Evidence from Afghanistan

  Rising Food Prices and Declining Food Security: Evidence from Afghanistan

  Dean Jolliffe

  Using nationally-representative household survey data and confidential geo-coded data on violent incidents

  we examine the relationship between conflict and food insecurity in Afghanistan. Spatial mappings of the raw data reveal large variations in levels of food insecurity and conflict across the country; surprisingly

  high conflict provinces are not the most food insecure. Using a simple bivariate regression model of conflict (violent incidents and persons killed or injured) on food security (calorie intake and the real value of food consumed)

  we find mixed associations. But once we move to a multivariate framework

  accounting for household characteristics and key commodity prices

  we find robust evidence that in Afghanistan levels of conflict and food security are negatively correlated. We also find that households in provinces with higher levels of conflict experience muted declines in food security due to staple food price increases relative to households in provinces with lower levels of conflict

  perhaps because the former are more disconnected from markets. Gaining a better understanding of linkages between conflict and food insecurity and knowing their spatial distributions can serve to inform policymakers interested in targeting scarce resources to vulnerable populations

  for example

  through the placement of strategic grain reserves or targeted food assistance programs.

  Conflict

  Food Price Shocks

  and Food Insecurity: The experience of Afghan households

  This paper examines how criminalizing the act of bribing a foreign public official affects international trade flows using a watershed global anti-corruption initiative — the 1997 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. I exploit variation in the timing of implementation by exporting countries and in the level of corruption of importing countries to quantify the Convention's effects on bilateral exports. I use a large panel of country pairs to control for confounding global and national trends and shocks. I find that

  on average

  the Convention caused a reduction in exports from signatory countries to high corruption importers relative to low corruption importers. In particular

  we observe a 5.7% relative decline in bilateral exports to importers that lie one standard deviation lower on the Worldwide Governance Indicators corruption index. This suggests that by creating large penalties for foreign bribery

  the Convention indirectly increased transaction costs between signatory countries and high corruption importers. The Convention may have induced OECD firms to divert their exports to less corrupt countries; while non-OECD firms not bound by the Convention may have increased their exports to corrupt countries. I also find evidence that the Convention's effects differed across product categories.

  The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade

  Amponsah

  W.

  We examine the implications of the violence and instability following the 2007 Kenyan elections and how it affected cut flower trade between Kenya and the EU. Using the Rotterdam demand model

  we find that the post-election violence had a negative impact on EU imports from Kenya equivalent to €33 million – which is significant given the importance of flowers to Kenya’s economy. Results show that even a short period of violence can have an effect on trade since instability in an exporting country causes importers to source from other countries perceived as less risky (persisting even when order is restored).

  Violence

  Instability

  and Trade: Evidence from Kenya’s Cut Flower Sector

  Daniel Kaufmann

  We study procurement bribery utilizing survey data from 11

  000 enterprises in 125 countries. About one-third of managers report that firms like theirs bribe to secure a public contract

  paying about 8 percent of the contract value. Econometric estimations suggest that national governance factors

  such as democratic accountability

  press freedom

  and rule of law

  are associated with lower bribery. Larger and foreign-owned firms are less likely to bribe than smaller domestic ones. But among bribers

  foreign and domestic firms pay similar amounts. Multinational firms appear sensitive to reputational risks in their home countries

  but partially adapt to their host country environment.

  Who Bribes in Public Procurement and Why

  The Impact of Food Price Increases on Food Security of the Most Vulnerable Households: Evidence from Afghanistan

  Wheat Flour Price Shocks and Household Food Security in Afghanistan

  Dean Jolliffe

  Based on data from Afghanistan collected prior to and during the 2007-2008 food price crisis

  this paper illustrates that caloric intake is an ineffectual indicator for monitoring the onset of food insecurity. Unconditional Quantile Regression estimates indicate that the most vulnerable of households

  which cannot afford to make substantial cuts to calories

  exhibit no decline in caloric intake in response to increasing wheat prices. In contrast

  households with high-calorie diets experience large declines. The estimates also reveal declines in dietary diversity across the entire distribution of households. The most vulnerable households may be sacrificing diet quality to maintain calories

  with the potential for serious and long-term health consequences.

  Food Insecurity in Vulnerable Populations: Coping with food price shocks in Afghanistan

  Rising Food Prices and Coping Strategies: Household-level Evidence from Afghanistan

  This article investigates the impact of rising wheat prices on household food security in Afghanistan. Exploiting a unique nationally-representative household survey

  we find evidence of large declines in the real value of per capita food consumption. Smaller price elasticities with respect to calories than with respect to food consumption suggest that households trade off quality for quantity as they move away from nutrient-rich foods such as meat and vegetables toward staple foods. Our work improves upon country-level simulation studies by providing estimates of actual household food security during a price shock in one of the world's poorest

  most food-insecure countries.

  Rising Food Prices and Coping Strategies: Household-level Evidence from Afghanistan

  Anna

  D'Souza

  Baruch College

  UCLA

  The World Bank

  UCLA

  The World Bank

  New York University

  The World Bank

  Johns Hopkins University

  Economic Research Service

  USDA

  UCLA

  The World Bank

  Consultant

  The World Bank

  Consultant

  The World Bank

  Teaching Assistant

  UCLA

  Teaching Assistant

  UCLA

  Adjunct Professor

  Johns Hopkins University

  Teaching Assistant

  UCLA

  Research Economist

  Economic Research Service

  USDA

  Visiting Fellow

  New York University

  Associate Professor

  Baruch College