George Mason University - Economics
Master of Arts (M.A.)
Economics
George Mason University
Ph.D
Economics; Austrian Economics and Institutions and Development
George Mason University
Bellarmine University
George Mason University
Fairfax
VA
Research Assistant
George Mason University
August 2011-August 2013
Research Assistant
George Mason University
Tampa
Florida
Speaking on wealth and income inequality on the Stossel show.
Assistant Professor of Economics
University of Tampa
I received my BA from Bellarmine in 2011 with majors in economics and business administration. I had an additional concentration (minor) in mathematics. While at Bellarmine
I served as the President of the Campus Ministry Council for two years and the Vice President of the Economics and Finance Club from 2010-2011. \n\nI worked as a tutor for the Academic Resource Center offering specific course tutoring
general study strategies
and other academic assistance to individuals and groups in economics
history
and biology.
Bellarmine University
Mercatus Graduate Fellow
Provide quality research assistance to Mercatus Center faculty. Actively participate in Center seminars
lectures and workshops.
George Mason University
Society for the Development of Austrian Economics
Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
Economics
Business Administration
Mathematics
Bellarmine University
Non-Market Decision-Making
Austrian Economics
Defense Economics
Comparative Economic Systems
2013 Oregon Law Review: Panel I
Lecture at the University of Oregon School of Law on the economics of drug prohibition (minute 70)
Open Player in New Window A Step Forward: Creating a Just Drug Policy for the United States ASSESSING THE LANDSCAPE OF DRUG POLICY Michele Alexandre
University of Missippi School of Law Jane Bambauer
University of Arizona College of Law Abigail Hall
Mercatus Fellow
George Mason University Chris Gibson
High Intensity
Abigail Hall
Abby Hall is a third year PhD student in the Department of Economics at George Mason University and a second year Mercatus PhD Fellow. While an undergraduate
she was an intern at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Louisville Branch on their Economic Education team.
Abby Hall is a fourth year PhD student in the Department of Economics at George Mason University and a Mercatus Center Dissertation Fellow. While an undergraduate
she was an intern at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Louisville Branch. She earned a BA in Economics and Business Administration from Bellarmine University.
MRUniversity: Edward Gibbon Wakefield
Short Lecture on Marginal Revolution University on Edward Gibbon Wakefield and systematic colonization. I discuss his work and his influence on thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx.
Was dispersed ownership of land in the colonies also viewed as an explicit or implicit political liability for the home country
perhaps based on the experience of the American Revolution?
Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Systematic Colonization
MRUniversity: Can the government influence private media?
Lecture on Marginal Revolution University on government influence on private media reporting. Specifically
we examine the differences between reports on human rights violations of US allies during the Cold War.
Government and private media
How does government exert influence over private media?
Can the government influence private media?
MRUniversity: The unintended consequences of media
Lecture on Marginal Revolution University on the effect of media. This video looks at attitudes of individuals along the Serbian/Croatian border and how exposure to opposition media may increase instances of ethnic violence.
Is listening to media always good for people and for society?
The unintended consequences of media
Econometrics
Data Analysis
Public Speaking
Teaching
International Relations
Political Economy
Microsoft Office
Economic Development
Policy Analysis
Statistics
International Development
Higher Education
Economics
Analysis
Public Policy
Qualitative Research
Quantitative Research
Teamwork
University Teaching
Research
Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of US Militarism
Many Americans believe that foreign military intervention is central to protecting our domestic freedoms. But Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall urge engaged citizens to think again. Overseas
our government takes actions in the name of defense that would not be permissible within national borders. Emboldened by the relative weakness of governance abroad
the U.S. government is able to experiment with a broader range of social controls. Under certain conditions
these policies
tactics
and technologies are then re-imported to America
changing the national landscape and increasing the extent to which we live in a police state.\n\nCoyne and Hall examine this pattern—which they dub \"the boomerang effect\"—considering a variety of rich cases that include the rise of state surveillance
the militarization of domestic law enforcement
the expanding use of drones
and torture in U.S. prisons. Synthesizing research and applying an economic lens
they develop a generalizable theory to predict and explain a startling trend. Tyranny Comes Home unveils a new aspect of the symbiotic relationship between foreign interventions and domestic politics. It gives us alarming insight into incidents like the shooting in Ferguson
Missouri and the Snowden case—which tell a common story about contemporary foreign policy and its impact on our civil liberties.\n
Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of US Militarism
Ann Zerkle
This paper analyzes a hidden cost of war: the effect of the mass mobilization of reserve troops on the response times of domestic emergency services to accidents. We provide a statistical examination of this linkage following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and find that mobilization significantly increases response times to accidents in the United States. These mobilization-related costs are exacerbated by both legal restrictions and issues of replacing highly specialized human capital.
A Hidden Cost of War: The Impact of Mobilizing Reserve Troops on Emergency Response Times
Following the start of the war on terror in 2001
U.S. policymakers determined that winning the war on drugs in Afghanistan was necessary for winning the war on terror. Yet despite spending $8.4 billion on drug interdiction in Afghanistan since 2002
opium production has grown substantially. We examine the failures of the U.S.-led war on drugs in Afghanistan using the tools of economics. By driving the opium economy into the black market
the war on drugs has fostered regime uncertainty
resulted in the violent cartelization of the drug industry
empowered the Taliban insurgency
and contributed to corruption. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan has broader implications for international drug and terrorism policy.\n
The War on Drugs in Afghanistan: Another Failed Experiment with Interdiction
In 1964
President Lyndon B. Johnson declared “war” on poverty. One component of the ensuing cadre of government agencies and initiatives was the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC)
charged with overseeing the development of the impoverished region stretching from southern New York to northern Alabama. Despite the fact that the ARC is now one of the longest-running regional development agencies
it has largely failed in its goals to develop the region and much of Appalachia remains mired in poverty. This work examines the reasons for the failure of the Appalachian Regional Commission and domestic
state-led development aid. I find that the ARC has failed to achieve its goals for the region due to its inability to perform rational economic calculation and as a result of issues of political economy.
Mountains of Disappointment: The Failure of State-Led Development Aid in Appalachia
This paper provides a political economy analysis of the evolution of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or “drones”
in the United States. Focus is placed on the interplay between the political and private economic influences; and their impact on the trajectory of political
economic
and
in this case
military outcomes. We identify the initial formation of the drone industry
trace how the initial relationships between the military and the private sector expanded over time
and discuss how the industry has expanded. Understanding the history and evolution of UAV technology
as well as the major players in the industry today
is important for ongoing policy debates regarding the use of drones
both domestically and internationally.
The Political Economy of Drones
The Empire Strikes Back: Adam Smith
John Stuart Mill
and the Robust Political Economy of Empire
Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists. Adam Smith argued that the British Empire was a net cost while John Stuart Mill concluded the same empire was a net benefit. Contemporary arguments about a U.S. Empire map neatly to the divergent views of Smith and Mill. In addition to engaging in an exercise in history of thought
we use Smith’s political economy as a means of adjudicating between the different claims regarding the feasibility of empire. In doing so
we subject the claims of proponents of American Empire against the standard of robust political economy
which holds that intervention must generate desirable outcomes where less than ideal incentive and epistemic conditions hold. In doing so
we conclude that many of the claims made by proponents are fragile under less than ideal conditions.
The Empire Strikes Back: Adam Smith
John Stuart Mill
and the Robust Political Economy of Empire
This paper traces the roots of police militarization in the United States to a variety of foreign military interventions
including WWII and the Vietnam War. We analyze how these earlier conflicts
in conjunction with the subsequent War on Drugs and War on Terror
contributed to the militarization of domestic police. Also discussed is how the effects of police militarization disproportionately impact those individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds
particularly racial minorities.\n
Foreign Intervention
Police Militarization
and the Impact on Minority Groups
Why Development Programmes Fail: William Easterly and the Political Economy of Intervention
Throughout his considerable body of work
William Easterly has identified several critical problems with foreign aid and economic development programmes. In particular
he argues that many working in areas of development act as ‘planners’
who believe they can implement effective policies but who in fact lack the necessary knowledge. Moreover
Easterly claims that these agents face perverse incentives that lead to suboptimal development outcomes. This article explores the theoretical roots of Easterly’s critiques and relates them to the work of two Nobel prize‐winning economists
F.A. Hayek and James M. Buchanan. It explores the broader applicability of Easterly’s criticisms by applying a similar framework to military activity.
Why Development Programmes Fail: William Easterly and the Political Economy of Intervention
Institutional bottlenecks refer to path-dependent institutional arrangements which contribute to economic stagnation. In his research
Timur Kuran identifies several historical institutional bottlenecks which contributed to economic decline and underdevelopment of the Middle East. We use Kuran’s research as springboard to ask: what can be done about institutional bottlenecks? To answer this question we draw on the work of F.A. Hayek who emphasized the centrality of institutions for social order and the limits on human reason in constructing a preferable state of affairs. We conclude that focus must be on the meta-rules through which the process of institutional evolution takes place. While we cannot know the specific outcomes of this evolutionary process ex ante
we can establish constraints to guide it. Reforms
therefore
should be focused on removing barriers to discovery instead of on selecting specific predefined end states.
Institutional Bottlenecks: What Can be Done?
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or “drones” have become a core component of the U.S. military arsenal following September 11
2001. In much of the literature and public discourse regarding drones
it is assumed that drone policy is created within the broader “public interest.” That is
those who construct drone policy set aside private incentives and other motives to construct policy solely to achieve the goals of U.S. citizens and maximize some larger social welfare function. This paper identifies the propositions associated with this public interest ideal and examines their accuracy. I find a general disconnect between the empirical evidence and the public interest assumption. In several cases
the evidence directly contradicts the assumption of public interest. In light of these findings I offer an alternative
and more realistic
analytical framework to adjudicate between observed realities and stated goals.
Drones: Public Interest
Public Choice
and the Expansion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
In 1906 the United States instituted its first drug laws. Over time
drug prohibition and criminalization have continued
becoming what is known today as the “War on Drugs.” This paper examines the political economy of the drug war with particular emphasis on the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. We analyze the effects of prohibition on violence
drug potency
and cartelization in the drug market. In addition
we examine how the drug policies of the U.S. government have led to a progressive militarization of domestic police forces
fostered an erosion of civil liberties
and contributed to the weakening of private property. We conclude that drug prohibition works against many of the stated goals of its advocates and offer an alternative to present drug policy.\n
Keep Off the Grass: The Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy
The provision of public goods is often used to justify the state. Since many highly-valued goods such as education
national defense
roads
etc.
possess some public characteristics (i.e. non-rivalry and non-excludability)
standard theory predicts such goods will be underprovided by private markets. The state is typically seen as the remedy to this problem. In contrast to this typical view
this paper analyzes the private provision of public and quasi-public goods in a free society. In particular
we examine philanthropy as an avenue through which such goods are already produced and may be provided in a society without a central government. We use Buchanan’s (1965) theory of clubs and Leeson’s (2011) discussion of clubs and “constitutional effectiveness” as a springboard to analyze how philanthropic giving and the provision of goods with public qualities under anarchy might work.
Anarchy
Philanthropy
and the Provision of Public Goods in a Free Society
This paper develops the political economy of the militarization of domestic policing. We analyze the mechanisms through which the “protective state” — where the government utilizes its monopoly on force to protect citizens’ rights — devolves into a “predatory state” which undermines the rights of the populace. We apply our theory to the U.S.
where we trace the (failed) historical attempts to establish constraints to separate the military functions and policing functions of government. In doing so we emphasize the role of crises in the form of perpetual wars — the “War on Drugs” and the “War on Terror” — in the accelerated militarization of domestic policing.
The Creeping Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing
The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with Mechanized Terror
Hall Blanco
Abigail R.
Hall Blanco
University of Tampa