Abigail Hall

 AbigailR. Hall

Abigail R. Hall

  • Courses1
  • Reviews10

Biography

George Mason University - Economics


Resume

  • 2011

    Master of Arts (M.A.)

    Economics

    George Mason University

    Ph.D

    Economics; Austrian Economics and Institutions and Development

    George Mason University

  • 2007

    Bellarmine University

    George Mason University

    Fairfax

    VA

    Research Assistant

    George Mason University

    August 2011-August 2013

    Research Assistant

    George Mason University

    Tampa

    Florida

    Speaking on wealth and income inequality on the Stossel show.

    Assistant Professor of Economics

    University of Tampa

    I received my BA from Bellarmine in 2011 with majors in economics and business administration. I had an additional concentration (minor) in mathematics. While at Bellarmine

    I served as the President of the Campus Ministry Council for two years and the Vice President of the Economics and Finance Club from 2010-2011. \n\nI worked as a tutor for the Academic Resource Center offering specific course tutoring

    general study strategies

    and other academic assistance to individuals and groups in economics

    history

    and biology.

    Bellarmine University

    Mercatus Graduate Fellow

    Provide quality research assistance to Mercatus Center faculty. Actively participate in Center seminars

    lectures and workshops.

    George Mason University

    Society for the Development of Austrian Economics

    Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)

    Economics

    Business Administration

    Mathematics

    Bellarmine University

    Non-Market Decision-Making

    Austrian Economics

    Defense Economics

    Comparative Economic Systems

  • 2013 Oregon Law Review: Panel I

    Lecture at the University of Oregon School of Law on the economics of drug prohibition (minute 70)

    Open Player in New Window A Step Forward: Creating a Just Drug Policy for the United States ASSESSING THE LANDSCAPE OF DRUG POLICY Michele Alexandre

    University of Missippi School of Law Jane Bambauer

    University of Arizona College of Law Abigail Hall

    Mercatus Fellow

    George Mason University Chris Gibson

    High Intensity

    Abigail Hall

    Abby Hall is a third year PhD student in the Department of Economics at George Mason University and a second year Mercatus PhD Fellow. While an undergraduate

    she was an intern at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

    Louisville Branch on their Economic Education team.

    Abby Hall is a fourth year PhD student in the Department of Economics at George Mason University and a Mercatus Center Dissertation Fellow. While an undergraduate

    she was an intern at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

    Louisville Branch. She earned a BA in Economics and Business Administration from Bellarmine University.

    MRUniversity: Edward Gibbon Wakefield

    Short Lecture on Marginal Revolution University on Edward Gibbon Wakefield and systematic colonization. I discuss his work and his influence on thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx.

    Was dispersed ownership of land in the colonies also viewed as an explicit or implicit political liability for the home country

    perhaps based on the experience of the American Revolution?

    Edward Gibbon Wakefield and Systematic Colonization

    MRUniversity: Can the government influence private media?

    Lecture on Marginal Revolution University on government influence on private media reporting. Specifically

    we examine the differences between reports on human rights violations of US allies during the Cold War.

    Government and private media

    How does government exert influence over private media?

    Can the government influence private media?

    MRUniversity: The unintended consequences of media

    Lecture on Marginal Revolution University on the effect of media. This video looks at attitudes of individuals along the Serbian/Croatian border and how exposure to opposition media may increase instances of ethnic violence.

    Is listening to media always good for people and for society?

    The unintended consequences of media

    Econometrics

    Data Analysis

    Public Speaking

    Teaching

    International Relations

    Political Economy

    Microsoft Office

    Economic Development

    Policy Analysis

    Statistics

    International Development

    Higher Education

    Economics

    Analysis

    Public Policy

    Qualitative Research

    Quantitative Research

    Teamwork

    University Teaching

    Research

    Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of US Militarism

    Many Americans believe that foreign military intervention is central to protecting our domestic freedoms. But Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall urge engaged citizens to think again. Overseas

    our government takes actions in the name of defense that would not be permissible within national borders. Emboldened by the relative weakness of governance abroad

    the U.S. government is able to experiment with a broader range of social controls. Under certain conditions

    these policies

    tactics

    and technologies are then re-imported to America

    changing the national landscape and increasing the extent to which we live in a police state.\n\nCoyne and Hall examine this pattern—which they dub \"the boomerang effect\"—considering a variety of rich cases that include the rise of state surveillance

    the militarization of domestic law enforcement

    the expanding use of drones

    and torture in U.S. prisons. Synthesizing research and applying an economic lens

    they develop a generalizable theory to predict and explain a startling trend. Tyranny Comes Home unveils a new aspect of the symbiotic relationship between foreign interventions and domestic politics. It gives us alarming insight into incidents like the shooting in Ferguson

    Missouri and the Snowden case—which tell a common story about contemporary foreign policy and its impact on our civil liberties.\n

    Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of US Militarism

    Ann Zerkle

    This paper analyzes a hidden cost of war: the effect of the mass mobilization of reserve troops on the response times of domestic emergency services to accidents. We provide a statistical examination of this linkage following the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and find that mobilization significantly increases response times to accidents in the United States. These mobilization-related costs are exacerbated by both legal restrictions and issues of replacing highly specialized human capital.

    A Hidden Cost of War: The Impact of Mobilizing Reserve Troops on Emergency Response Times

    Following the start of the war on terror in 2001

    U.S. policymakers determined that winning the war on drugs in Afghanistan was necessary for winning the war on terror. Yet despite spending $8.4 billion on drug interdiction in Afghanistan since 2002

    opium production has grown substantially. We examine the failures of the U.S.-led war on drugs in Afghanistan using the tools of economics. By driving the opium economy into the black market

    the war on drugs has fostered regime uncertainty

    resulted in the violent cartelization of the drug industry

    empowered the Taliban insurgency

    and contributed to corruption. The U.S. experience in Afghanistan has broader implications for international drug and terrorism policy.\n

    The War on Drugs in Afghanistan: Another Failed Experiment with Interdiction

    In 1964

    President Lyndon B. Johnson declared “war” on poverty. One component of the ensuing cadre of government agencies and initiatives was the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC)

    charged with overseeing the development of the impoverished region stretching from southern New York to northern Alabama. Despite the fact that the ARC is now one of the longest-running regional development agencies

    it has largely failed in its goals to develop the region and much of Appalachia remains mired in poverty. This work examines the reasons for the failure of the Appalachian Regional Commission and domestic

    state-led development aid. I find that the ARC has failed to achieve its goals for the region due to its inability to perform rational economic calculation and as a result of issues of political economy.

    Mountains of Disappointment: The Failure of State-Led Development Aid in Appalachia

    This paper provides a political economy analysis of the evolution of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or “drones”

    in the United States. Focus is placed on the interplay between the political and private economic influences; and their impact on the trajectory of political

    economic

    and

    in this case

    military outcomes. We identify the initial formation of the drone industry

    trace how the initial relationships between the military and the private sector expanded over time

    and discuss how the industry has expanded. Understanding the history and evolution of UAV technology

    as well as the major players in the industry today

    is important for ongoing policy debates regarding the use of drones

    both domestically and internationally.

    The Political Economy of Drones

    The Empire Strikes Back: Adam Smith

    John Stuart Mill

    and the Robust Political Economy of Empire

    Recent scholarship regarding the idea of a U.S. Empire has raised serious questions as to the feasibility and desirability of imperial ambitions. This paper traces the debate over the net-benefit of empire back to the Classical economists. Adam Smith argued that the British Empire was a net cost while John Stuart Mill concluded the same empire was a net benefit. Contemporary arguments about a U.S. Empire map neatly to the divergent views of Smith and Mill. In addition to engaging in an exercise in history of thought

    we use Smith’s political economy as a means of adjudicating between the different claims regarding the feasibility of empire. In doing so

    we subject the claims of proponents of American Empire against the standard of robust political economy

    which holds that intervention must generate desirable outcomes where less than ideal incentive and epistemic conditions hold. In doing so

    we conclude that many of the claims made by proponents are fragile under less than ideal conditions.

    The Empire Strikes Back: Adam Smith

    John Stuart Mill

    and the Robust Political Economy of Empire

    This paper traces the roots of police militarization in the United States to a variety of foreign military interventions

    including WWII and the Vietnam War. We analyze how these earlier conflicts

    in conjunction with the subsequent War on Drugs and War on Terror

    contributed to the militarization of domestic police. Also discussed is how the effects of police militarization disproportionately impact those individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds

    particularly racial minorities.\n

    Foreign Intervention

    Police Militarization

    and the Impact on Minority Groups

    Why Development Programmes Fail: William Easterly and the Political Economy of Intervention

    Throughout his considerable body of work

    William Easterly has identified several critical problems with foreign aid and economic development programmes. In particular

    he argues that many working in areas of development act as ‘planners’

    who believe they can implement effective policies but who in fact lack the necessary knowledge. Moreover

    Easterly claims that these agents face perverse incentives that lead to suboptimal development outcomes. This article explores the theoretical roots of Easterly’s critiques and relates them to the work of two Nobel prize‐winning economists

    F.A. Hayek and James M. Buchanan. It explores the broader applicability of Easterly’s criticisms by applying a similar framework to military activity.

    Why Development Programmes Fail: William Easterly and the Political Economy of Intervention

    Institutional bottlenecks refer to path-dependent institutional arrangements which contribute to economic stagnation. In his research

    Timur Kuran identifies several historical institutional bottlenecks which contributed to economic decline and underdevelopment of the Middle East. We use Kuran’s research as springboard to ask: what can be done about institutional bottlenecks? To answer this question we draw on the work of F.A. Hayek who emphasized the centrality of institutions for social order and the limits on human reason in constructing a preferable state of affairs. We conclude that focus must be on the meta-rules through which the process of institutional evolution takes place. While we cannot know the specific outcomes of this evolutionary process ex ante

    we can establish constraints to guide it. Reforms

    therefore

    should be focused on removing barriers to discovery instead of on selecting specific predefined end states.

    Institutional Bottlenecks: What Can be Done?

    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or “drones” have become a core component of the U.S. military arsenal following September 11

    2001. In much of the literature and public discourse regarding drones

    it is assumed that drone policy is created within the broader “public interest.” That is

    those who construct drone policy set aside private incentives and other motives to construct policy solely to achieve the goals of U.S. citizens and maximize some larger social welfare function. This paper identifies the propositions associated with this public interest ideal and examines their accuracy. I find a general disconnect between the empirical evidence and the public interest assumption. In several cases

    the evidence directly contradicts the assumption of public interest. In light of these findings I offer an alternative

    and more realistic

    analytical framework to adjudicate between observed realities and stated goals.

    Drones: Public Interest

    Public Choice

    and the Expansion of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

    In 1906 the United States instituted its first drug laws. Over time

    drug prohibition and criminalization have continued

    becoming what is known today as the “War on Drugs.” This paper examines the political economy of the drug war with particular emphasis on the unintended consequences of drug prohibition. We analyze the effects of prohibition on violence

    drug potency

    and cartelization in the drug market. In addition

    we examine how the drug policies of the U.S. government have led to a progressive militarization of domestic police forces

    fostered an erosion of civil liberties

    and contributed to the weakening of private property. We conclude that drug prohibition works against many of the stated goals of its advocates and offer an alternative to present drug policy.\n

    Keep Off the Grass: The Economics of Prohibition and U.S. Drug Policy

    The provision of public goods is often used to justify the state. Since many highly-valued goods such as education

    national defense

    roads

    etc.

    possess some public characteristics (i.e. non-rivalry and non-excludability)

    standard theory predicts such goods will be underprovided by private markets. The state is typically seen as the remedy to this problem. In contrast to this typical view

    this paper analyzes the private provision of public and quasi-public goods in a free society. In particular

    we examine philanthropy as an avenue through which such goods are already produced and may be provided in a society without a central government. We use Buchanan’s (1965) theory of clubs and Leeson’s (2011) discussion of clubs and “constitutional effectiveness” as a springboard to analyze how philanthropic giving and the provision of goods with public qualities under anarchy might work.

    Anarchy

    Philanthropy

    and the Provision of Public Goods in a Free Society

    This paper develops the political economy of the militarization of domestic policing. We analyze the mechanisms through which the “protective state” — where the government utilizes its monopoly on force to protect citizens’ rights — devolves into a “predatory state” which undermines the rights of the populace. We apply our theory to the U.S.

    where we trace the (failed) historical attempts to establish constraints to separate the military functions and policing functions of government. In doing so we emphasize the role of crises in the form of perpetual wars — the “War on Drugs” and the “War on Terror” — in the accelerated militarization of domestic policing.

    The Creeping Militarization of U.S. Domestic Policing

    The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with Mechanized Terror

    Hall Blanco

    Abigail R.

    Hall Blanco

    University of Tampa

ECON 306

4.5(10)